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COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION-INTERNATIONAL 
AND INTERSTATE ASPECTS 
ERNEST G. LORENZENt 
I 
Historical Introduction 
England.1 The development of commercial arbitration in England 
was particularly affected by a dictum of Lord Coke in Vynior' s Case/ 
decided in 1609, where plaintiff was permitted to recover on a bond 
given for the faithful performance of an arbitration agreement. Lord 
Coke explained that where there is an agreement to submit to arbitra-
tion, a party "might countermand it, for a man cannot by his act make 
such authority, power, or warrant not countermandable which is by the 
law and of its nature countermandable"; but the bond is thus forfeited 
because the condition of the bond is broken by such revocation. With 
the enactment of the Statute of Fines and Penalties,~ in 1697, the use of 
a bond in submission was no longer effective, but the fact that the method 
of making the agreement effective had been abrogated did not induce 
the courts to abandon the revocability rule. There resulted the irra-
tional situation that a valid agreement was utterly ineffective, for the 
courts would give only nominal damages for breach of the agreement 
tEdward J. Phelps Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1. The following abbreviations are used: 
BLUE Boox: Reports from the Governments in the British Self-Governing Dominions 
and His Majesty's Representatives in Foreign Countries as to the Enforcement of British 
Arbitration Awards. (London, 1912.) 
CLUNET: JoURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVil. 
NUSSBAU:~>l:: INTERNATIONALES J AHRBUCH FUR SCHIEDSGERICHTSWESEN IN ZIVIL-UND 
HANDELSSACHEN, vols. 1-3 (1926, 1928, 1931). The first volume has been translated into 
English and the references in that volume are to this translation. (Oxford Univ. Press, N.Y. 
1928). 
REVUE: REvuE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE. 
2. 8 Co. 80a and 81b; also reported in 1 Brownlow & Goldesborough 64, and 2 Brown-
low & Goldesborough 290. There appear to have been English cases involving arbitration 
much earlier than Vynior's case. For a detailed study of the origin of the doctrine of 
revocability see CoHEN, CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (1918) c. 8, 9; Sayre, 
Development of Commercial Arbitration (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 595. 
At the time that Coke announced the doctrine, there appears to have been no hostility 
to arbitration agreements, for recovery on the bond-the usual and almost invariable method 
at that time for insuring performance of any agreement, the entire law of contracts being 
in its infancy-was available. See Sayre, supra, at 603; CoHEN, op. cit. supra, at 92. 
3. 8 & 9 W:r.r. III, c. 11 (1696-97). 
[716] 
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on the theory that there could be no actual injury in forcing people to 
litigate in the King's own courts of justice. The view that courts can-
not approve irrevocability of arbitration agreements because it "ousts 
the jurisdiction of the court" did not appear in the early cases, and is 
not to be found until the case of Kill v. Hollister,4 decided in 1746. It 
was created perhaps to justify the maintenance of the revocability rule 
which could no longer be mitigated by the use of bonds after the passage 
of the Statute of Fines and Penalties.5 The doctrine has also been 
credited to the judicial jealousy of the English courts, whose judges and 
court officers in early times were paid by fees on the volume of business 
which came to them. 6 
The English Parliament and courts started early to modify this 
situation. The first arbitration act, passed in 1698,7 provided that the 
parties might agree to make their submission agreement a rule of court, 
whereby the party who revoked should be subject to imprisonment for 
contempt of court. However, this did not prevent the parties from re-
voking the authority of the arbitrator at any time before an award was 
made. In 1833, however, it was provided8 that where the submission 
agreement had been made a rule of court under the Act of 1698, the 
authority of the arbitrators appointed should be irrevocable, except 
by leave of court, and the arbitrators might proceed to make a binding 
award. The Common Law Procedure Act of 18549 further provided 
that any agreement of submission to arbitration by consent could be 
made a rule of court, unless the parties expressly agreed to the con-
trary. Power was also given to the court to stay the proceedings in 
an action brought contrary to the agreement, and to appoint an arbi-
trator where there was a failure of appointment according to the agree-
ment of the parties. The Arbitration Act of 188910 completed the 
effectiveness of arbitration agreements. Under this Act agreements to 
refer disputes to arbitration voluntarily, whether the disputes be exist-
ing ones or future ones, are given full effect, subject to certain general 
powers of control and supervision by the courts. Section 4 of the Act 
provides for a stay of legal proceedings where one party to the agree-
ment brings an action at law despite the agreement and the court is 
"satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not 
4. 1 Wils. K. B. 129 (1746). 
5. See Sayre, supra note 2, at 604. 
6. See CoHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, 253 et seq.; Sayre, supra note 2, at 609. 
7. 9 WM. III, c. 15 (1698). 
8. 3 & 4 WM. IV, c. 42 (1833). 
9. 17 & 18 Vxcr. c. 125, §§ 3-17 (1854). 
10. 52 & 53 Vxcr. c. 49 (1889). 
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be referred in accordance with the submission, and that the applicant 
was, at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still re-
mains, ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper con-
duct of the arbitration.1111 Section 5 gives the court power to appoint 
an arbitrator, umpire or third arbitrator in certain cases where there 
has been refusal to appoint or failure of appointment. Section 6 further 
provides that, unless the agreement shows a contrary intention, the 
parties may themselves supply vacancies caused by death of an arbi-
trator or refusal by an arbitrator to act; or where one party fails to 
make his appointment of an arbitrator according to the agreement, the 
other party may authorize his appointee to act as sole arbitrator, whose 
award shall be binding on both parties. 
It should be noted that the English acts have always covered both 
present and future disputes. The early statutes contained detailed pro-
visions governing the manner of the submission and the regulation of the 
proceedings which had to be complied with in order to obtain the advan-
tages of the statute. On the other hand, the statute of 1889 is very 
liberal in presuming every arbitration agreement to be within the statute, 
and provides only in general terms for regulation of proceedings. 
Meanwhile the courts also had been busy loosening the shackles upon 
arbitration agreements. The revocability rule, as has been seen, dis-
solved early into the public policy doctrine against ousting courts of 
jurisdiction, and, in 1855, in the case of Scott v. Avery/2 the applica-
tion of this doctrine to arbitration agreements was recognized as irra-
tional and inequitable where the agreement was open to the interpreta-
tion that the arbitration was only a condition precedent to resort to the 
courts. That case held that an agreement not to resort to the courts of 
law or equity until after an arbitral determination of the claims of the 
parties was sound policy and did not oust the courts of jurisdiction, 
but merely established a valid "condition precedent" to jurisdiction. 
Even the whole question of liability under the contract may be deter-
mined in England at common law if put in the form of a condition prece-
dent.13 
United States. Common-law arbitration in the United States followed 
the more reactionary steps of the English development. Vynior's Case 
and Kill v. Hollister, or at least Scott v. Avery,14 narrowly interpreted, 
11. The application of the stay must be made "at any time after appearance and before 
delivering any pleadings or taking any other steps in proceedings." 
12. 5 H. L. Cas. 811 (1856). 
13. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) 3010. 
14. In many states of this country agreements to arbitrate the whole question of 
liability are ineffectual even though expressed in the form of a condition precedent, 
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have been the favorites. Arbitration agreements, whether to submit 
future disputes or existing disputes, are regarded almost universally in 
our common-law cases as revocable. A party can terminate the agree-
ment either by giving notice of revocation or by bringing an action at 
law in disregard of it. The reason given by the great majority of courts 
is the old doctrine of Kill v. Hollister against ousting the courts of juris-
diction. An action for breach of a common-law agreement to arbitrate 
an existing dispute was generally allowed, but th~ damages were ordi-
narily only nominal.15 
Many states have long had legislation making irrevocable and 
enforceable agreements to submit existing disputes to arbitration.16 
These statutes, however, are strictly limited to agreements which con-
form to detailed regulations. The agreement must be in writing and 
generally there is provision that the submission be made "an order of 
court" by filing the agreement with the clerk of court. There are also 
requirements in more or less detail regarding parties who can submit 
under the statute, causes which can be settled by such arbitration, exe-
cution of the agreement, conduct of the arbitral hearing, and enforcement 
or impeachment of the award. 
Agreements to arbitrate future disputes were, until 1920, almost com-
pletely left in the realm of the "revocability rule." Pennsylvania seems 
to have stood alone in recognizing such agreements as enforceable at 
common law, and in Pennsylvania they were irrevocable only where the 
arbitrators were named or designated.17 Even at the present time the 
great majority of states have done nothing to change the revocability 
rule in regard to such agreements. The Draft State Arbitration Act, 
sponsored by the American Arbitration Society, and first adopted in 
New York in 1920/8 repudiates the rule with respect to all arbitration 
whereas agreements providing merely for the determination of a particular fact are effective. 
WILLISTON, op. cit supra note 13, at 3012. See also Note (1923) 26 A. L. R. 1077. 
15. WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 3009; STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS 
(1930) 253-262. 
With reference to the breach of future disputes clauses, Sturges says: "Statements also 
frequently appear to the effect that a party who is aggrieved by the breach of such an 
agreement can maintain an action for damages. So few cases, however, have involved 
such assertion that if there is such a rule of law it rests upon this popular acclaim." 
STURGES, op. cit. supra, at 82. 
16. See STURGES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 263 et seq. 
17. See id. at 48-50. In recent years the Supreme Courts of Washington and Colorado 
have rejected the revocability rule with respect to future disputes clauses in written contracts, 
although the arbitration statutes of these states do not expressly embrace future disputes. 
Id. at 505. 
18. N. Y. CoNSOL. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 2. See Popkin, Judicial Construction of the 
N. Y. Arbitration Law of 1920 (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 329; Fraenkel, The New York 
Arbitration Law (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 623. 
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agreements (whether to submit existing or future disputes) and declares 
the agreements to be irrevocable from date of execution without the 
necessity of filing in any court. Provision is made for stay of trial in 
an action at law on issues referable to arbitration by the agreement of 
the parties, and a method is provided for specifically enforcing the 
agreement where one of the parties refuses to proceed to arbitration. An 
order from the state supreme court, or a judge thereof, may be procured 
directing the parties .to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with 
the terms of their contract. If a party refuses to appoint an arbitrator 
or arbitrators, the court, or an individual judge, may, upon application, 
make the necessary appointment.19 The New York statute has been 
substantially followed or copied by a number of other states.20 The 
United States Arbitration Act,21 in force since January 1, 192{>, relat-
ing to controversies concerning matters arising in admiralty and in for-
eign and interstate commerce, exclusive of most contracts of employment, 
also follows closely the New York Act.22 
Continental Countries. In Roman law existing disputes might be ar-
bitrated ( compromissum), but no effect was given to agreements to 
submit future disputes to arbitration.23 This attitude was maintained 
19. Such an appointment cannot be made ex parte. In this case, as in the case of a 
motion to compel, personal service within the state is required. 
20. ARiz. CoDE (Struckmeyer, 1928) c. 93, art. 1, amended by Laws 1929, c. 72; CAL. 
CoDE Crv. PRoc. (1931) §§ 1280-93; CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 5840-56; LA. GEN. STAT. 
(1932) §§ 405-22; N. H. PUB. LAws (1929) c. 147; N. J. Laws (1923) c. 134; Oruo 
GEN. CoDE (Page, 1932) § 12148 (1-17); ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §§ 21-101 to 21-113, LAws 
1931, c. 36; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 5, §§ 161-181; R. I. Pus. LAWS (1929) c. 
1408, §§ 1-18; Wis. STAT. (1931) §§ 298.01-298.18. See also MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 
251. 
Nevada, North Carolina, Utah and Wyoming have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act, 
recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. This 
act does not provide for specific performance and applies only to agreements to submit 
existing disputes. NEv. CoMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 510-34; N. C. CoDE (1931) §§ 
898(a)-898(x); UTAH REv. STAT. (1933) tit. 104, c. 36, §§ 1-22; WYo. REv. STAT. ANN. 
(1931) c. 7, §§ 7-101 to 7-124. 
For a thorough discussion and annotation of all arbitration statutes of this country, see 
STURGES, op. cit. supra note 15. 
21. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 u. s. c. §§ 1-15 (1926). 
22. Of importance from an international point of view are the Court of Commercial 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce and the arrangements for arbitra-
tion made between the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the Chambers of 
Commerce of some of the most important Latin-American cities. See Jones, Historical 
Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States (1928) 12 MINN. L. REv. 
240. 
23. Roman law, it seems, never gave effect to agreements to submit future disputes. 
The compromissum required that the arbitrators should be appointed at the time of the 
agreement. Such agreement to submit existing disputes to arbitration was not enforceable 
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by the canon law.24 The old Germanic law, on the other hand, is said 
to have recognized the binding nature of agreements to submit future 
disputes to arbitration, granting a stay of proceedings where a party 
resorted to the courts in violation of such agreement.25 After the recep-
tion of the Roman law in Germany the Roman-canonical compromissum 
displaced the Germanic rules for the most part, and arbitration became 
thus limited to existing disputes. With the development of territorial 
sovereignty during the· seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the 
growing jealousy of the ordinary courts with respect to arbitral proce-
dure, the practice of submitting disputes to arbitration practically dis-
appeared. It was allowed by the Judicial Codes of Bavaria (1753) 
and of Prussia ( 1794) ,26 but the restrictions which had impeded the 
development of arbitration in Germany were not effectively removed 
until the enactment of the German Code of Civil Procedure in 187727 
permitting agreements for the submission of future disputes and author-
izing the courts to appoint arbitrators where the parties failed to do so. 
The French law of arbitration was, until 1925, based wholly upon 
Article 1006 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. This Code has 
had a considerable influence upon the law of other countries, without 
being instrumental, however, in advancing the cause of arbitration. It 
requires that the agreement to arbitrate must designate the objects in 
dispute and the names of the arbitrators, thus limiting the validity of 
such agreements to existing controversies.28 Unlike American courts, 
the French did not regard the requirements thus laid down as "proce-
dural" or "remedial" in their nature, so as to be applicable to foreign 
agreements, nor did they, in the end, consider them as constituting rules 
of international public order (public policy), whicl). would prevent the 
in classical times; nor was an award. Notwithstanding such an agreement or award, the 
parties could bring the case before the ordinary courts, which were without power to 
grant a stay of trial or to compel the opposing party to proceed with the arbitration. If 
a penalty had been agreed upon in case of breach, such penalty could be recovered, but 
until the time of Justinian that was all. Justinian provided for the enforcement of an 
award, if it was accepted in writing or if the parties allowed ten days to pass by without 
notice of repudiation. BucKLAND, TE..'ITBOOK ON RoMAN LAw (2d ed. 1932) 532. 
24. KRAUSE, DIE GESCIDCHTLICHE ENTWICKELUNG DES SCmEDSGERICHTSWESENS IN 
DEUTSCHLAND (1930) 50; ENTWICKELUNGSLINIEN DES DEUTSCHEN SCmEDSGERICHTSWESENS, 
3 NussBAUM 229. 
25. KRAusE, op. dt. supra note 24, at 39; see also Krause, 3 NussBAUM 227. 
26. KRAusE, op. dt. supra note 24, at 84; see also Krause, 3 NussBAUM 236. 
27. KRAusE, op. dt. supra note 24, 114 et seq.; see also Krause, 3 NussBAUM 236 
et seq. 
28. The only exception to the rule was contained in Article 332 of the Commercial Code, 
where the arbitration of future disputes is expressly sanctioned in matters of marine 
insurance. 
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recognition of all foreign agreements for the arbitration of future dis-
putes. The arbitration of future disputes, limited to contracts between 
merchants or to contracts having a commercial character, was author-
ized in France by the law of December 31, 1925.29 
Of the other continental countries, many have followed the German 
example in allowing the arbitration of future disputes, while some con-
tinue to have provisions similar to those of Article 1006 of the French 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
Latin-American Countries. In Latin-America little interest has been 
manifested thus far in the subject of arbitration, the result being that 
no modern arbitration statutes are to be found in any of the leading 
countries. Brazil regulates the matter of arbitration in its Civil Code 
of 1917, but according to a decision of the Supreme Court of the state, 
agreements for the submission of future disputes to arbitration are still 
invalid.30 Argentina31 has in its Code of Civil Procedure provisions simi-
lar to Article 1006 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, so that agree-
ments for the submission of future disputes to arbitration must be re-
garded as invalid. In the other Latin-American countries provision 
is likewise made for the submission of existing disputes only.32 
II 
Comparative Law 
Scope of Arbitration Agreements. Section 1026 of the German Code 
of Civil Procedure provides that "An arbitral agreement concerning 
future disputes is not effective if it does not refer to a definite legal rela-
tionship and the legal disputes arising therefrom."33 An agreement, 
therefore, that all disputes arising between the parties from their busi-
ness relations shall be submitted to arbitration would be invalid. On 
the other hand, a provision that all disputes arising under a specific 
contract of partnership shall be settled by arbitration is valid.34 
Formal Requisites. At common law no formalities were required for 
the validity of a submission to arbitration, except where the case fell 
within !he statute of frauds. Statutory submission agreements, however, 
29. See Andre-Prudhomme, The Present Position of the Arbitration Clause under the 
Law of France, 1 NussBAUM 70. 
30. See Valladiio, Die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Zivil--und Handelssachen in Brasilien, 
3 NussBAUM 59. 
31. Art. 770. 
32. See OBREGON, LATIN-AMERICAN CoMMERCIAL LAw (1921) 798. 
33. So also some cantons of Switzerland. See Fritsche, Schfedsgerichte in Zivilsaclsm 
nach schweizerischem Recht, 2 NussBAUM 56. 
34. Mittelstein, Law and Practice of Arbitral Tribunals in Germany, 1 NussBAUM 35. 
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are generally required to be in writing and in many instances have to be 
acknowledged or made a rule of court.35 The modern statutes authoriz-
ing the submission of future disputes, which are based on the Draft State 
Arbitration Act, invariably demand the agreement be in writing. In 
England the submission must be in writing in order to come under the 
Arbitration Act of 1885; an oral submission is generally valid, but can 
be revoked at any time prior to the award.36 The Act does not require 
a formal document nor need all the terms be contained in the same 
document; an exchange of letters is sufficient.37 It is yet to be deter-
mined whether an arbitration agreement, signed by one party only, as 
in buyers' and sellers' orders, invoices and confirmations or insurance 
policies, is sufficient under· the United States statutes relating to the 
arbitration of future disputes.38 
Continental countries are somewhat divided on the question of whether 
a writing should be ·required for the validity of agreements for arbitra-
tion. In some countries a document signed by both parties is required.39 
In others an exchange of letters is sufficient.40 Sometimes the require-
ment of a writing is deemed waived if the parties proceed with the arbi-
tration.41 In some countries the agreement may be oral.42 In Germany 
either party has the right to have it reduced to writing; 43 compliance 
must then, it seems,44 be had with Section 126 of the German Code 
which provides that "If a writing is prescribed by law ... the signatures 
of the parties must be attached to the same document. If several identi-
cal copies of the same contract are drawn up, it is sufficient if each party 
signs the copy intended for the other party." Purchase orders, letters 
of confirmation, or even an exchange of letters would not satisfy this 
requirement. 
In Latin-America submission agreements are required to be executed 
in a public instrument.45 
35. STURGES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 218-225. 
36. RussELL, ARBITRATION AND AWARD (12th ed. by V. R. Aronson, 1931) 336. 
37. Id. at 326-327. 
38. STURGES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 95. 
39. PoLAND, CoDE CIV. PROc. art. 487, 3 NussBAUM: 266. 
40. Hungary (See Fabinyi, Scltiedsgerichte naclt ungarisclzem Recht, 3 NussBAUM 40) ; 
Italy (See Ascarelli, Arbitration under Italian Law, 1 NussBAUM: 80) ; Norway (See Knoph, 
Die norwegisclzm Gesetzesbestimmungen iiber Sclziedsgericlztswesen, 2 NussBAUM: 16). ' 
41. E. g., in some cantons of Switzerland. See Fritsche, supra note 33, 'at 56. 
42. E.g., Sweden, Arbitration Law of June 14, 1929, art. 1; and some cantons of 
Switzerland, Fritsche, supra note 33, at 57. 
43. GERMANY, CODE CIV. PROC. § 1027. 
44. 1\:Iittelstein, supra note 34, at 38. 
45. ARGENTINE, CODE CIV. PRoc. art. 770; URUGUAY, CoDE CIV. PRoc. art. 540; OBREGON, 
op. cit. supra note 32, at 798. 
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Parties Competent to Submit. At common law neither married women 
nor infants46 had the power of submitting their disputes to arbitration, 
but under modern legislation the former can generally bind their separate 
property as freely as can a femme sole. On the continent and in Latin-
America, a married woman's capacity to enter into a valid contract of 
arbitration may depend upon her husband's authorization. If she is 
authorized to engage in business, she would have the capacity to enter 
into contracts of arbitration with respect to controversies arising out 
of such business. Agreements to arbitrate by minors depend upon 
the ordinary principles relating to minors' contracts, concerning which 
there exists great diversity in the different countries. Partners may 
have in some countries the ii:nplied power to bind the partnership by 
a contract to submit to arbitration controversies arising out of the 
partnership business, whereas in others they are not able to do so 
without express authorization or ratification. 
Revocability. The history of the Anglo-American doctrine of the 
revocability of agreements to submit disputes to arbitration has been 
indicated. The notion that arbitration agreements may be valid but 
revocable is foreign to continental and Latin-American countries; they 
are either valid or invalid, and if valid, are irrevocable. Under the 
modern arbitration statutes in the United States agreements for arbitra-
tion are irrevocable. In England they are irrevocable except by leave 
of the court or a judge.47 
Stay of Proceedings. Wherever an agreement to arbitrate is regarded 
as valid and irrevocable, any court action brought in violation thereof 
will, on defendant's motion, be stayed or dismissed for want of jurisdic-
tion.48 In England the court is under a prima facie duty to grant such 
a stay, but it may, for sufficient reasons, decline to do so.49 Under the 
modern arbitration acts of the United States the courts have no discre-
tionary power, but must grant the stay whenever it appears that a valid 
46. See RussELL, op. cit. supra note 36, at 21-23; STURGES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 
159 et seq. 
47. ARBITRATION Acr (1889) § 1. 
48. Austria (See Wehli, Arbitral Tribmwls under Austrian Law, 1 NussBAUM 117); 
Denmark (See Raffenberg, Recht und Praxis der Sclziedsgerichte in Danemark, 2 Nuss-
BAUM: 6); Germany, CoDE Crv. PRoc. § 274; Holland (See Van Praag, Arbitral Tribunals 
for Civil and Commercial Disputes under the Law of the Netherlands, 1 NussBAUM 102); 
Hungary (Fabinyi, supra note 40, at 35); Italy (Ascarelli, supra note 40, at 82); Poland 
(CODE Crv. PROc. art. 486, § 2, 3 NussBAUM 266); Sweden (See Fehr, Schiedsgericlzte nach 
schwedisclzem Recht, 2 NussBAUM 44-45). 
49. Supra note 47, § 4 
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submission agreement exists, and the dispute falls within such agree-
ment.uo 
Specific Performance. No method for the specific performance of 
arbitration agreements is provided by the English Arbitration Act of 
1887.u1 Under the modern arbitration statutes in the United States52 
the defaulting party may be ordered by the court to proceed to arbitra-
tion; and when the terms of the statute have been satisfied, the specific 
performance of the contract is made mandatory, without any discre-
tionary power on the part of the court.53 On the continent the specific 
performance of contracts is regarded in some countries as the normal 
remedy for the breach of contract, and not as an extraordinary remedy 
to be granted only when damages are inadequate.54 In such countries 
agreements for arbitration can, of course, be specifically enforced.55 In 
other countries the remedy of specific performance does not exist or is 
granted only hesitatingly.56 
Who Can Be Arbitrators? Most countries have liberal provisions on 
this subject. Generally it is sufficient that the arbitrator shall have 
legal capacity, no discrimination being made against women57 or for-
eigners.us In some countries there is a specific provision that no local 
judge in active service can be an arbitrator.59 Spain and some Latin-
American countries require "legal" arbitrators to be trained in the law.60 
Appointment of Arbitrators and Umpires. Statutes frequently pro-
vide that if a party who is to appoint an arbitrator does not do so in 
due time or if two arbitrators are to choose an umpire and cannot agree 
50. For a criticism of the mandatory provisions relating to stay and specific performance, 
see Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a Voluntary 
Proceeding (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 1258. 
51. See p. 742, infra. 
52. Regarding statutory submission agreements, see STURGES, op. cit. supra note 15, 
at 83. 
53. The Massachusetts act does not provide for specific performance. MAss. GEN. LAws 
( 1932) c. 251. 
54. See GERMANY, Crv. CoDE § 2401. 
55. Denmark (Raffenberg, supra note 48, at 7) ; Norway (BLUE BooK 55) ; Sweden 
(Fehr, supra note 48, at 45). 
56. GODRON, LA CLAUSE COMPROMISSOIRE (1916). 
57. In some countries women cannot be arbitrators. For example, Holland, Van Praag, 
supra note 48, at 101. 
58. In Spain, arbitrators who are not amicable compounders must be citizens. Ballve, 
Das Sclziedsgericlltswesm i1t Spanien, 2 NussBAUM 96. 
59. AusTRIA, CoDE Crv. PRoc. § 578; Hungary, Fabinyi, supra note 40, at 43; PoLAND, 
Crv. PRoc. art. 489, § 2, 3 NussBAUM 266. 
60. SPAIN, CoDE Crv. PRoc. art. 790. 
HeinOnline  -- 43 Yale L. J. 726 1933-1934
726 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43 
upon a choice, the court may make such appointment. 61 In some coun-
tries such power does not exist62 or its existence is doubtful. 63 
Judicial Determination of Validity of Submission Agreements Prior 
to Rendition of Awards. In England and the United States the courts 
have the power where an action has been brought impeaching the con-
tract of arbitration to restrain the defendant from proceeding to arbi-
tration until the right to impeach has been determined. The foreign 
codes are generally silent on the subject.64 In Germany such an action 
is not allowed to interfere with or to delay the arbitral proceedings. Sec-
tion 103 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "The arbitrators may 
continue the proceedings and render an award, even if the permissibility 
of the arbitral proceedings is denied, especially when it is contended that 
a valid submission agreement does not exist, that the submission agree-
ment is inapplicable to the dispute in question, or that an arbitrator is 
not competent to proceed with the 'arbitral proceedings." 
Arbitration Hearing. The statutes of the different states in this 
country65 and of foreign countries vary greatly in their attitude in this 
matter. Some prescribe detailed rules for the regulation of the arbitral 
proceeding; others leave it to the determination of the parties or to the 
arbitral tribunal, subject to certain reservations. 66 The English Arbi-
tration Act of 1887 contains various provisions relating to the conduct 
of the reference, but these control only when the parties have not ex-
pressed a contrary intention in their submission agreement. 07 On the 
continent there appears to be agreement that the arbitrators cannot 
61. So in England, ARBITRATION Acr (1889) § 5; and generally in the United States, 
STURGES, op. dt. supra note 15, at 7 et seq.; AusTRIA, ConE Crv. PROC. § 582; GERMANY, 
ConE CIV. PRoc. § 1029, par. 2; NoRWAY, ConE Crv. PROC. § 455; PoLAND, ConE Crv. PRoc. 
art. 492, § 1; SWEDEN, ARBITRATION LAws (1929) No. 145, § 8, 3 NussBAUM 269, 270. 
62. E.g., Denmark, Raffenberg, supra note 48, at 7. 
63. The French Law of 1925 contains no provisions on the subject. The Government 
bill did not provide for such an appointment, whereas the bills of Flandis & Clemente! 
did so provide, on the condition, however, that the domestic laws of the other party to 
the arbitration admits of the same procedure. Andre-Prudhomme, supra note 29, at 75. 
64. Such impeachment is allowed also in at least some of the foreign countries. Den-
mark, Raffenberg, supra note 48, at 6; Canton of Bern, ConE CIV. PRoc. art. 385. 
65. See STURGES, op. dt. supra note 15, at 422-519. 
66. In some cantons of Switzerland the parties may determine the procedure, and if 
they do not do so, the ordinary procedure before the President of the Tribunal sitting as a 
single judge controls. In others the procedure may be determined by the arbitral court, 
subject to certain mandatory provisions. In still others the proceedings are controlled 
by the ruies governing in the ordinary courts. See Fritsche, supra note 33, at 59. 
-67. ARBITRATION Acr (1887) First Schedule. RussELL, op. dt. supra note 36, at 338 
et seq. 
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subpoena witnesses or administer oaths. Where this necessity occurs 
recourse must be had to the courts. 68 
Are the Arbitrators Bound by Law? May the parties validly stipulate 
that "The arbitrators and umpire shall interpret this present agree-
ment as an honorable engagement, rather than as a merely legal obliga-
tion . . . The arbitrators and umpire are relieved from all judicial for-
malities and may abstain from following the strict rules of law"?69 In 
some countries the codes regulate two types of arbitration known as 
"legal" arbitration and arbitration by "amicable compounders,1170 the 
latter not being bound by rules of law.71 In these countries it is clear 
that "arbitrators" in the strict sense must apply legal rules. In other 
countries only one system appears in the code but there is an express 
provision that arbitrators must comply with rules of law unless the parties 
have agreed that they shall act merely as "amicable compounders.1172 
In still other countries, though amicable compounders are unknown as 
such,73 arbitrators are not necessarily governed by strict rules of law.74 
In England the arbitrators must apply the ordinary rules for the ad-
ministration of justice in the absence of an express provision in the sub-
mission to the contrary, and failure to do so may amount to such mis~ 
68. As to the different attitude taken in England and the United States, see ARBITRA-
TION Ar:r (1887) § 8, The First Schedule (g) ; RussELL, op. cit. supra note 36, at 160-161; 
STURGES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 390 et seq., 486 et seq. 
69. See Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Co., 25 F. (2d) 930, 931 (C. C. A. 9th, 
1928). 
70. For example, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela. See OBRE-
GON, op. cit. supra note 32, at 798. In some Latin-American countries the amicable com-
pounders are called "arbitros arbitratores" or simply "arbitratores." See Cmr.E, CoDE 
CIV. PRoc. arts. 792 et seq.; MEXIco, CoDE CIV. PRoc. arts. 1334 et seq.; VENEZUELA, CoDE 
CIV. PROC. art. 510. 
In Spain, Argentina and Cuba the codes expressly provide that the decisions by amicable 
compounders shan· be rendered e."!:clusively on the basis of documents submitted and the 
testimony of the parties. SPAIN, CoDE CIV. PROc. art. 833, par. 2; ARGENTINA, CODE CIV. 
PRoc. art. 802; CUBA, CODE CIV. PRoc. art. 832. 
71. So e."!:pressly, ARGENTINA, CoDE CIV. PRoc. art. 802; CUBA, CODE CIV. PROC. art. 832; 
ME.-.aco, CoDE CIV. PRoc. arts. 1281, 1340; see also OBREGON, op. cit. supra note 32 at 798. cf. 
LA. CIV. CODE (1932) §§ 3109-3110. 
72. FRANcE, CoDE CIV. PRoc. art. 1019; BELGIUM, CoDE CIV. PRoc. art. 1019; HoLLAND, 
CODE ClV. PROc. art. 636; ITALY, CoDE CIV. PROC. art. 20. 
73. E.g., in Germany and Austria. 
74. According to Nussbaum, the recent development in Germany tends toward the recog-
nition of the binding force of the law. Nussbaum, Problems of International Arbitration, 
1 NussBAUM 20. Section 1042, par. 2 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, as amended 
in 1924, determines that the arbitrators cannot disregard provisions that are ius cogens. 
This provision was abrogated, however, by the Law of July 25, 1930 (RGBL 1930 II 
p. 361). 
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conduct that the award will be set aside.7G In the United States, it 
'seems, arbitrators are not bound by the strict rules of law or equity 
unless there is an express stipulation to this effect in the agreement for 
arbitration.76 However, if the arbitrators undertake to decide the dis-
pute according to strict law and it appears from the face of the award 
that they have misconceived any principles of law applicable to the 
case, the award will be set aside.77 
The Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce provide that "The Court of Arbitration shall give to the 
arbitrators or arbitrator power to act as 'amiables compositeurs' when-
ever all parties to the arbitration have previously given their consent to 
this course and it will not in any way interfere with the legal enforcement 
of the award.ms 
III 
The Conflict of Laws 
United States. Questions involving arbitration agreements from the 
standpoint of the conflict of laws rarely came before the state courts 
prior to the adoption of the modern arbitration statutes. The leading 
case on the subject is Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield 
Ry. Co., decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1914.79 A con-
tract had been entered into in Ohio between two Pennsylvania corpora-
tions for the contruction of a railway in Pennsylvania. The contract 
contained a provision that all matters in dispute arising out of the 
contract were to be decided by the chief engineer of the railroad com-
pany, the parties waiving "all right of action, suit or suits or other remedy 
in law or otherwise under this contract or arising out of the same to 
enforce any claim except as the same shall have been determined by 
said arbitrator." Under the law of Pennsylvania the arbitration clause 
could be specifically enforced. Suit was brought in New York to re-
cover a certain sum alleged to be due under the contract. The trial 
court dismissed the complaint on the ground that a submission to the 
chief engineer and an award by him, or an offer or tender of such sub-
mission on the part of the plaintiff was a valid condition to plaintiff's 
right to sue. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division· but 
75. RussELL, op. cit. suPra note 36, at 379-380. 
76. STURGES, op. cit. SttPra note 15, at 500-502. 
77. King v. The Falls of Neuse Manufacturing Co., 79 N. C. 360 (1873). "The case5 
have not yet fully determined to what extent arbitration may disregard statutory law as 
distfuguished from the law of the courts." STURGES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 501. 
. 78. Arbitration Rules, Art. 16 (3), 1 NUSSBAUM 263. 
79. 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N. E. 653 (1914). 
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was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Judge Hogan, in writing the 
opinion of the court, advanced the following argument in support of the 
decision: 
"Tested by the principles of the cases cited, we conclude that the language 
employed in the contract in question is susceptible of but one construction, 
namely, an attempt on the part of the parties to the same to enter into an 
independent covenant or agreement to provide for an adjustment of all ques-
tions of difference arising between the parties by arbitration to the exclusion 
of jurisdiction by the courts. 
"Notwithstanding the decisions of the courts of Pennsylvania that the con-
tract as to arbitration was valid and enforceable in that state, judicial comity 
does not require us to hold that such provision of a contract which is contrary 
to a declared policy of our courts . . . shall be enforced as between non-
residents of our jurisdiction· in cases where the contract is executed and to 
be performed without this state, and denied enforcement when made and 
performed within our state."80 
Judge Cardozo, in a concurring opinion, justified the decision of the 
court on the ground that the agreement to submit all differences to 
arbitration related to the law of remedies. The reasoning of the learned 
Judge was as follows: 
"An agreement that all differences arising under a contract shall be sub-
mitted to arbitration relates to the law of remedies, and the law that governs 
remedies is the law of the forum. In applying this rule, regard must be had 
not so much to the form of the agreement as to its substance. If an agree-
ment that a foreign court shall have exclusive jurisdiction is to be condemned 
. . . it is not saved by a declaration that resort to the foreign court shall 
be deemed a condition precedent to the accrual of a cause of action. A rule 
would not long survive if it were subject to be avoided by so facile a device. 
Such a contract, whatever form it may assume, affects in its operation the 
remedy alone."81 
To what extent have the recent arbitration statutes brought about 
a change of attitude on the part of our courts? From the standpoint 
of the conflict of laws there is probably no field in which a greater 
variety of fact situations may conceivably arise. The following situa-
tions involving a foreign element may present themselves, whether or 
not the state be one having a modern arbitration act: The contract 
may be made in the state and call for arbitration in another state or in 
a foreign country, or it may be silent on the question where the arbitra-
tion is to take place. Or the contract may have been made in some 
other state or country without specifying where the arbitration is to 
80. ld. at 351-352, 105 N. E. at 655. 
81. Id. at 352, 105 N. E. at 655. 
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take place; or it" may call for arbitration in the state of the forum, 
or it may call for arbitration in a third state. Finally, it may not appear 
where the contract was made, but the place of arbitration may be speci-
fied to be the state of the forum, or some third state or country. 
In each of the above situations, the law of the state in which the con-
tract was made may render it irrevocable or revocable and unenforceable. 
If it is valid and enforceable by the lex loci, it may be unenforceable 
by the law of the state or country in which the arbitration is to take 
place; or, what is more likely to happen in fact, it is made in a state 
or country under the local law of which it is unenforceable, and arbitra-
tion is to take place in a state or country in which it is valid and en-
forceable. Further complications will occur if the residence or domicil 
of the parties is a material factor, for in each of the above situations 
both parties may be residents of the same state or country--of the state 
or country where the agreement for arbitration was made or where the 
arbitral tribunal is to sit, or of the forum, or of some other state or 
country-or they may be residents of different states or countries. 
Which of the above cases would fall within an arbitration statute of 
the forum? If it falls within such a statute of the forum for one pur-
pose, does it necessarily fall within it for all purposes? Will a stay 
of proceedings be granted by virtue of the arbitration statute of the 
forum? Will the parties be ordered to proceed to arbitration in another 
state or country? Under what circumstances will an arbitrator be ap-
pointed in accordance with the local statute? The actual decisions of 
the courts in this country throw little light upon the problems suggested; 
so far as they point in any definite direction it would appear that they 
are unfavorable from the standpoint of interstate and international com-
mercial arbitration. 
In Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg,82 various questions arose 
with respect to the application of the New York Arbitration Act of 1920. 
\Vas it applicable to contracts made prior to its enactment? Was it 
applicable to an action brought prior to the enactment of the law? Was 
it applicable to a provision for arbitration made and to be performed 
in a jurisdiction where arbitration was enforceable when the contract 
was made and to be performed? Was it applicable to a contract con-
taining a provision for arbitration without the state of New York? In 
answering the first question in the affirmative and the second in the 
negative, the learned court, speaking through Judge Cardozo, said: 
"The common-law limitation upon the enforcement of promises to arbitrate 
is part of the law of remedies . . . The rule to be applied is the rule of the 
82. 230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288 (1921). 
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forum. Both in this court and elsewhere, the law has been so declared. Arbi-
tration is a form of procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is not 
a definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differences grow. This 
statute did not attach a new obligation to sales already made. It vindicated 
by a new method the obligation then existing."83 
The questions actually decided by the case were not questions of the 
conflict of laws in the ordinary sense but the application of the statute 
from the standpoint of time, that is, whether it was to be applied to exist-
ing contracts and pending actions. For the purpose in hand it was 
held that the statute was remedial and was therefore applicable to 
existing contracts. The court did not find it necessary to answer the 
other questions submitted but left them open for future consideration.84 
One of these later came before the First Department of the Appellate 
Division of New York in Matter of Inter-Ocean Food Products, Inc.,S5 
in which a contract for the purchase of California raisins had been 
made in New York between two New York corporations. Under the 
terms of the contract all disputes arising out of the contract were to be 
settled before the arbitration committee of the Dried Fruit Association 
in San Francisco. In a dispute arising out of the contract, upon a motion 
of the seller before the Supreme Court of New York, an order was made 
that the parties proceed to arbitrate in California all disputes between 
them as provided for in the contract. This order, however, was reversed 
by the Appellate Division, which held that the only remedy available 
in the courts of New York was a stay of proceedings. The reasoning 
of the court was as follows: 
"The general trend of authority, it seems to me, is that no court will willingiy 
relinquish jurisdiction over controversies arising between those who are amen-
able to its judgments, nor will any sovereignty order its citizens or subjects to 
go before the tribunals of another sovereignty and submit to its jurisdiction 
that their differences may be adjudicated. 
"I am of the opinion that while an agreement to arbitrate in a foreign juris-
diction, and before a foreign arbitrator, is not invalid or illegal, it cannot be 
enforced as between citizens of this State who are the parties thereto, by com-
83. Id. at 270, 130 N. E. at 289, 290. 
84. Under the California Arbitration Act, arbitrations shall be held in California unless 
the parties have agreed in writing after the controversy arises that it shall be held else-
where. CAL. ConE Civ. PROc. (1930) § 1286. 
85. 206 App. Div. 426, 201 N.Y. Supp. 536 (1st Dep't 1923). The case was approved 
by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Co., 252 N. 
Y. 284, 169 N. E. 386 (1929). See also In re California Packing Corp., 121 Misc. 212, 201 
N. Y. Supp. 158 (Sup. Ct. 1923). In this case the contract provided for arbitration in 
California. The court denied an application for an order directing that the arbitration 
proceed in California, but held that the arbitration might be compelled in New York. 
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pelling them to go without the State, in a foreign jurisdiction and before a 
foreign tribunal, there to arbitrate their disputes."86 
Inasmuch as California at the time of this decision had not yet adopted 
its modern arbitration act, arbitration could not have been compelled 
in that state. No reference, however, was made to this fact in the 
opinion of the court. 
The above case was followed as precedent by the Supreme Court of 
New York in Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco,S1 where a contract, 
made in Cuba, provided that the parties "submit themselves to the courts 
of the City of Santiago de Cuba for all questions relating to the per-
formance or non-performance of this contract, expressly renouncing 
their right to litigate in any other place." It does not appear from the 
case whether both parties were residents of Cuba or not.83 
The question of the power to order arbitration in another state has re-
cently come before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of 
Nippon Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing-Thomas Corp.89 Plaintiff, a Jap-
anese corporation having an office in New York, agreed to sell to the de-
fendant, a Pennsylvania corporation, bales of raw silk. The contracts pro-
vided that "Every dispute, of whatever character, arising out of this con-
86. Supra note 85, at 432-433, 201 N. Y. Supp. at 540. 
87. 125 Misc. 728, 210 N.Y. Supp. 10 (Sup. Ct. 1925). 
88. "It would be too strict and narrow a limitation of the intention of the parties a,; 
expressed," said the court, "to hold that an agre-ement to submit to courts of foreign juris-
diction should not be treated as a submission to arbitration within the purview of the 
Arbitration Law." ld. at 733, 210 N. Y. Supp. at 15. 
Whereas stipulations like the above may be deemed to fall within the local arbitration 
act and thus to justify a stay, they do not oust the jurisdiction of the courts. See Sud-
bury v. Ambi Verwaltung Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, 213 App. Div. 98, 210 N. Y. 
Supp. 164 (1st Dep't 1925) (contract made in Germany between a resident of New York 
and a German corporation vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the German courts); Slios-
berg v. New York Life Insurance Co., 217 App. Div. 685, 217 N. Y. Supp. 226 (1st 
Dep't 1926) (contract made in Russia between a resident of Russia and a New York 
corporation submitting dispute to the jurisdiction of the St. Petersburg courts only). 
See also, The Fredensboro, 18 F. (2d) 983 (E. D. Pa. 1927); Danielsen v. Entre Rios 
Rys. Co., 22 F. (2d) 326 (D. Md. 1927). 
89. 170 Atl. 286 (Pa. 1934). In Katakura & Co. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Co., 307 Pa. 544, 
161 Atl. 529 (1932), the lower court had ruled that it had power to order the defendant to go 
to New York to submit to arbitration, but the Supreme Court had found it unnecessary to 
discuss the question, holding that a provision in the contract of arbitration that "Hearings 
shall be held customarily at Association Headquarters [New York City] where adequate room 
will be provided," did not designate New York as the exclusive place where the arbitration 
might be held under the contract, and that such arbitration might be enforced in Penn-
sylvania in the manner provided by the rules of the Association, or so far as they were not 
inconsistent with the laws of Pennsylvania and with the rules of the court of common 
pleas concerning procedure and practice under the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act. 
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tract, must be settled by arbitration in New York, to be conducted in the 
manner provided by the by-laws, rules and regulations of the Silk Asso-
ciation of America, Inc., governing arbitration." A dispute having aris-
en under the contract, the plaintiff prayed an order on the defendant to 
show cause why the dispute "should not be submitted to arbitration in 
the manner provided for in said contract." The Supreme Court, revers-
ing the decision of the lower court, held that the plaintiff's petition should 
be allowed. 
"The principal contention made in the opinion of the court below is that 
our Arbitration Act relates only to arbitrations to be held in Pennsylvania. 
The statute does not say so, and the argument brought forward to show that 
under sections 6, 1 O, and 11 ( 5 PS §§ 166, 170, 171) that conclusion must 
be implied, is not only both labored and inconclusive, but also wholly over-
looks other sections of the act. Moreover, it ignores the legal principle that 
it is our duty to sustain the act, if this can reasonably be done, and not to 
destroy it either in whole or in part."9o 
By what law will the validity and enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments be determined, if they are made in some state or country other 
than that of the forum? Will the courts go so far in their procedural 
point of view as to hold that the law of the forum governs without 
regard to the law of the state where the contract is made or the arbitra-
tion is to take place? The modern legislation making arbitration agree-
ments enforceable has been held to be remedial for some purposes; will 
it be held to be remedial for all purposes? Suppose a contract was 
unenforceable both by the law of the state where it was made and the 
law of the state where the arbitration is to be held, would it be enforce-
able nevertheless in any state having a modern arbitration statute? 
No direct decision on the point has been found. In Estate Property 
Corp. v. Hudson Coal Co.,91 a contract involving the lease of a Penn-
sylvania coal mine provided for the arbitration of all disputes or differ-
ences. An action arising out of an alleged breach of this contract hav-
ing been brought in New York, the learned court observed: "But should 
the Court entertain jurisdiction in view of the arbitration clause con-
tained in the agreement? The solution of this, in the light of the sub-
ject-matter and the contemplation of the parties, must be governed by 
the law of Pennsylvania."92 The court interpreted the Pennsylvania 
90. Id. at 289. In accord see California Lima Bean Growers' Association v. Mankowitz, 
154 AU. 532 (N.J. 1931). Other courts, however, have in this situation ordered arbitration 
in accordance with the local law, disregarding the stipulation altogether. In re California 
Packing Corp., supra note 85; see also In re Nozak Brothers, Inc., N.Y. L. J. Aug. 5, 1931. 
91. 132 Misc. 590, 230 N.Y. Supp. 372 (Sup. Ct. 1928). 
92. Id. at 595, 230 N.Y. Supp. at 378. 
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act, which contained provisions identical to those in New York, as 
applicable to contracts made prior to its enactment, provided no action 
was pending on the contract at the time of the passage of the act. In 
so doing, the court either ignored or overlooked the express provision in 
the Pennsylvania statute that it "shall not apply to contracts made prior 
to the taking effect of this act."93 Hence it is not clear whether the New 
York court would have applied the Pennsylvania statute had it known 
of its variance from the New York statute. The facts of the case do not 
disclose where the contract was made, nor the states in which the plain-
tiff and defendant corporations had been organized. The language of 
the court would indicate that it was inclined to look to the law of Penn-
sylvania as governing the enforceability of the contract, on the ground 
that the coal operations to which the contract related were to take place 
in Pennsylvania and that the parties must therefore be deemed to have 
contracted with reference to such law.94 So far the courts have paid 
little attention to the place where the arbitration agreement was made 
or where it was to be performed, or to the domicil of the parties. 
Another problem relates to the appointment of arbitrators by the 
courts where the party under a duty to make such appointment fails 
to do so, or the arbitrators cannot agree upon an umpire. The question 
of what court is the proper one to lend such assistance came before the 
New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison 
Manufacturing Co.9'J The contract for arbitration, in this case between 
a New York and a Maine corporation, was concluded in Massachusetts 
and called for the manufacture and delivery of tractors in that state. 
The arbitration clause did not specify where the arbitration was to take 
place. A controversy having arisen, the two arbitrators selected by 
the parties were unable to agree upon a third. On motion of the buyer's 
trustee in bankruptcy a third arbitrator was appointed by the Supreme 
Court of New York and the parties were directed to proceed to arbi-
tration before the tribunal thus constituted. Both parties entered appeals 
from the award rendered, of which defendant's was a challenge to the 
order directing arbitration. The Court of Appeals held the challenge to 
be too late, on the ground that, since the Supreme Court had power to 
appoint the third arbitrator, the order was not void, and there had been 
at most an error in the use of it. 
93. PA. STAT. SUP!'. (1928) § 606a-19. 
94. "If defendant should with reasonable dispatch move for a stay of this action 
pending a proper application to enforce arbitration, the motion would most likely be 
granted." Estate Property Corp. v. Hudson Coal Co., wpra note 91, at 597, 230 N. Y. Supp. 
at 380. ' ' ' : -1' U 
95. Supra note 85. 
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"A State is without power to modify by its statutes the terms, express or 
implied, of contracts made in other states in contemplation of their laws. The 
case may be supposed of an agreement made in Boston that a controversy shall 
be arbitrated by the Chamber of Commerce of that city, with the express 
provision that in no event shall there be arbitration by any one else. If the 
law of Massachusetts refuses to permit the appointment of a substitute, the 
law of New York may not modify by statute the content of the promise, and 
designate a substitute in the teeth of the agreement."96 
The case decides nothing more than that the power of the trial court to-
appoint an arbitrator could not, under the circumstances, be raised col-
laterally. 
The cases so far discussed arose in a state having a modern arbitra-
tion act. 'What, in view of the modern trend in legislation relating tO' 
commercial arbitration, will be the attitude of courts in states where 
such agreements are still revocable appears from the decision in Vita-
phone Corp. v. Electrical Research Products.97 An agreement had 
been made in New York between a New York corporation and a Dela-
ware corporation, providing that all disputes arising out of a certain 
contract were to be submitted to arbitration in New York. Two efforts. 
were made to settle some of the disputes by arbitration. The third 
effort became nugatory by reason of the resignation of an arbitrator. 
After a successor had been appointed, the arbitration continued, and 
many hearings held at great expense, complainant requested the arbi-
trators to withdraw from the proceedings. On their refusal to do so, a 
bill was filed in Delaware praying for relief. The respondent pleaded 
the arbitration agreement as a substantive defense. The Chief Justice, 
sitting as Chancellor, overruled the plea on the ground that the contract 
and the New York Arbitration Law merely provided a remedy for the 
settling of disputes. With matters of remedy governed exclusively by 
the law of the forum, and the courts of Delaware still opposed to 
being ousted of jurisdiction by the agreement of parties to an arbitra-
tion, the learned Chief Justice concluded that no effect could be given 
to a different policy established in New York by statute. The Supreme 
Court of Delaware98 overruled the decision of the lower court for the 
reason that in its opinion the arbitration proceedings had not broken 
down, so far as a Court of Equity was concerned, and the complainant 
96. Id. at 294-295, 169 N. E. at 389. 
97. 166 Atl. 255 (Del. Ch. 1933). See also 167 Atl. 845 (Del. Ch. 1933). See in regard 
to this case, Phillips, Arbitration and Conflict of Laws: A Study of Benevolent Com-
pulsiOiz (1934) 19 CoRN. L. Q. 197, at 216, 'n. 78; also (1933) 47 HARv. L. REV. 125; (1933): 
33 CoL. L. REv. 1440. 
98. Not yet reported. 
HeinOnline  -- 43 Yale L. J. 736 1933-1934
736 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43 
was therefore not justified in repudiating the obligations providing for 
such proceedings. But aside from this fact and complainant's conse-
quent lack of "clean hands," the higher court's views regarding the law 
seem to agree with those of the court below, as app'ears from the fol-
lowing: 
"The respondent, therefore contends that the arbitration clauses of these 
contracts irrevocably bind the parties to them, not only in the State of New 
York, but elsewhere, and that its plea should have been sustained by the court 
below. 
"This conclusion is based on the theory that the New York statute, and the 
contracts based thereon, relate to material and substantive rights, and that such 
rights are not only protected under the full faith and credit clause (Art. 4, 
Sect. 1) and the due process clause (14th Amendment) of the federal consti-
tution, but, also, by the rule of comity between states. 
"A contract, providing for arbitration, merely provides a remedy for the 
settling of disputes . . . The same rule applies, though by the terms of a 
statute arbitration contracts are made both irrevocable and enforceable . . . 
In considering the effect of the statute, Judge Cardozo, after reiterating his 
previous statement, that arbitration was merely a form of procedure for the 
settlement of differences, also added: 'It is not a definition of the rights and 
wrongs, out of which differences grow. This statute did not attach a new 
obligation to sales already made. It vindicated by a new method the obliga-
tion then existing.' That being true, Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 
286 U. S. 145, has no application to this case. The contract therein referred 
to was of statutory origin, but it clearly affected substantive rights, and not 
mere matters of procedure. Substantive contractual rights were also involved 
in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 201 U. S. 397." 
The question arises as to whether the attitude of the federal courts 
with reference to arbitration agreements has been more favorable than 
that of the state courts. In this connection, it must be borne in mind 
that the United States Arbitration Act, modeled after that of the New 
York Act, was not adopted until1925; 99 it must likewise be recalled that 
before this Act the remedy of specific performance was not available in 
our courts of admiralty. The question confronting the federal courts 
before 1925 was, therefore, whether they would recognize agreements 
for arbitration entered into in the state in which the court was sitting, 
or in some other state or country, and valid and enforceable by the law 
of such state or country, or valid and enforceable by the law of the state 
or country where the arbitration was to be held. The present article 
is concerned only with the attitude of the federal courts with respect to 
arbitration agreements entered into i1;1. a state or country other than 
99. See p. 720, supra. 
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the one in which the federal court is sitting.100 With respect to such 
foreign contracts the federal courts had held unanimously, prior to the 
United States Arbitration Act of 1925, that arbitration agreements made 
elsewhere, and valid both by the lex loci and the law of the state where 
the arbitration was to be held, were not enforceable.101 
To what extent has the United States Arbitration Act of 1925102 
changed the law so far as the federal courts are concerned? The Act 
is entitled "An act to make valid and enforceable written provisions or 
agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime 
100. The federal courts have declined to enforce the local state arbitration statute 
although the contract was made and the arbitration was to take place in. the state in which 
the court was sitting. Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 Fed. 319 (S.D. N.Y. 1921), 
ajj'd, 5 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F. (2d) 861 (N. D. N. Y. 
1926). 
While the case of Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, supra, was standing for trial 
in the lower federal court, proceedings were instituted in the state courts of New York 
for the specific performance of the contract. The case went up to the Court of Appeals, 
which held that the New York Arbitration Act could not apply to maritime contracts. 
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision on the ground that the 
New York Act related to procedure and thus did not conflict with the uniformity doctrine 
established by the Jensen case. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109 (1924). 
State courts may accordingly apply their arbitration statutes to maritime contracts with 
respect to which they have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts. Notwithstand-· 
ing the decision by the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals felt obliged to affirm 
the decision of the District Court on the ground that the New York Arbitration Act, being 
procedural in its nature, cannot affect the procedure and practice of the admiralty courts. 
In the following year, 1925, Congre..<s passed the United States Arbitration Act which pro-
vides for the specific performance of arbitral clauses in maritime and other contracts. See 
Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statute (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 67 (1927); Baum and 
Pressman, Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts (1930-
1931) 8 N.Y. U. L. Q. 238, 428. 
Regarding removal to a federal court of proceedings for arbitration under a state 
statute in a state court, see STURGES, op. cit. supra note 15, at 940-945; Baum and Press-
man, supra, at 253-256; Note (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 801. 
101. United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006 
(S. D. N. Y. 1915). Aktieselskabet Kom-Og Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget 
Atlanten, 232 Fed. 403 (S.D. N. Y. 1916), ajj'd, 250 Fed. 935, and 252 U. S. 313 (1920); 
The Eros, 241 Fed. 186 (E. D. N. Y. 1916), ajj'd, 251 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); see 
also Tatsuuma Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prescott, 4 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). 
The question whether the decisions of the highest court of the state in which the 
federal court is sitting or the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States were 
controlling in this matter, was held to be one of general law and thus governed by the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court holding arbitration agreements to be against 
public policy. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (U. S. 1874); Doyle v. Continental 
Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535 (1876). The same conclusion would be reached if suit were 
brought before a federal court in a state having a modem arbitration act. See Atlantic 
Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); California Prune and 
Apricot Growers' Association v. Catz American Co., 60 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932). 
102. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 u.s. c.§§ 1-15 (1926). 
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transactions, or commerce among the states or territories or with for-
eign nations.moa Section 2 of the Act makes agreements complying 
with its terms "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." Section 3 provides 
that where an action is brought in any court of the United States in 
violation of the agreement for arbitration, the court shall "stay the trial 
of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not 
in default in proceeding with such arbitration." Section 4 of the Act 
provides that "upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement 
for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court 
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceed-
ings under such agreement shall be within the district in which the 
petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed . . . m04 
If an agreement for arbitration is of the type specified in the Act7 
does the fact that it calls for arbitration in a country other than the 
United States prevent the enforcement of the agreement by the federal 
courts? If the case is not within the federal statute, has the act so 
changed the policy of the federal courts that an agreement for arbi-
tration, valid by the proper law, will be recognized and enforced? May 
.a petition be filed in the federal courts of "this country in such a case 
for an order to compel arbitration, and if suit is brought in violation 
of the agreement will a stay be granted? In The Silverbrook/05 where 
the question was raised for the first time, suit was brought in admiralty 
on foreign bills of lading providing for arbitration in London. The 
claimant moved for a stay of suit106 and reference of the issue to arbi-
tration. The motion was denied and the cause ordered to proceed in 
the usual course on the merits. The court said: 
103. A shipment between two foreign countries has been held not to constitute com-
merce among the several states or with foreign nations within the meaning of the United 
States Arbitration Act. The Volsinio, 32 F. (2d) 357 (E. D. N.Y. 1929). 
104. Section 8 of the Act provides as follows: "If the basis of jurisdiction be a 
cause of action otherwise justiciable in admiralty, then, notwithstanding anything herein 
to the contrary the party claiming to be aggrieved may begin his proceeding hereunder 
by libel and seizure of the vessel or other property of the other party according to the 
usual course of admiralty proceedings, and the court shall then have jurisdiction to direct 
the parties to proceed with the arbitration and shall retain jurisdiction to enter its 
decree upon the award." 
105. 18 F. (2d) 144 (E. D. La. 1927). ' 
106. A motion for a stay of suit is the proper method of raising the question; an 
exception to the jurisdiction will not do. The Fredensboro; see also Danielsen v. Entre 
Rios Rys. Co., both supra note 88. 
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"Although the basis of jurisdiction in this case is a cause of action otherwise 
justiciable in admiralty, and begun by a libel and seizure of a vessel according 
to the usual course of admiralty proceedings, and therefore of the class con-
templated by section 8 of the United States Arbitration Act, this court is with-
out jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed to arbitration as required by the 
concluding clause of that section, because the place and manner of arbitration 
prescribed by the terms of the contract are beyond the jurisdiction of this court, 
since the hearings and proceedings thereunder cannot be held conformable to 
the terms of this statute, and particularly to section 4, which requires the arbitra-
tion to proceed within the district in which the petition for an order directing 
such arbitration was filed."~07 
The language of Section 4 of the Act is, of course, not free from 
doubt from the standpoint of statutory construction, but the question 
is whether it should be so limited as to nullify the provisions of the 
same section that the order directing the parties to proceed with the 
arbitration shall be "in accordance with the terms of the. agreement.mos 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York reached the 
same conclusion as did the court in The Silverbrook.109 On the other 
hand, Judge Coleman in Danielson v. Entre Rios Rys. Co.110 has ex-
pressed the view111 that even if the remedy of specific performance under 
Section 4 were limited to agreements performable in the United States, 
the broad language of Section 3 would warrant the granting of a stay 
in cases where the arbitration is to take place in a foreign country. 
"The effect of the act then seems to be that it requires the courts to stay 
trial, upon motion of one of the parties, until arbitration is had, and to order 
arbitration if, as provided in section 4, 'the hearing and proceedings under 
such agreement shall be within the district in which the petition for an order 
directing such arbitration is filed.' In other words, there is nothing in the 
Act which indicates that, although the arbitration provided for may be beyond 
the jurisdiction of the court, this shall forestall or in any way curtail juris-
diction which the court would normally have of maritime suits. On the con-
trary, as is seen from the language of the sections of the act above quoted, it 
is contemplated that the proceedings may be brought in the usual manner 
and jurisdiction over the arbitration assumed if the arbitration provided for 
is to take place wifl!in the court's jurisdiction; if not, then the proceedings 
shall be stayed until the foreign arbitration is perfected, whereupon the court 
has power to enter a decree upon the award. That is to say, the only limita-
107. SuPra note lOS, at 147. 
108. STURGES, op. cit. suPra note 15, at 929-930. 
109. The Beechwood, 35 F. (2d) 41 (S.D. N.Y. 1929). 
110. SuPra note 88. Judge Campbell in The Volsinio, suPra note 103, stated tbat he 
agreed with Judge Coleman and disagreed with The Silverbrook, supra note 105: · 
111. The question of whetber tbe foreign arbitration was a condition to assumption 
of jurisdiction, was denied by tbe court. 
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tion imposed upon the court is a stay pending the perfection of what cannot 
be accomplished within the jurisdiction of the court, and such a stay is to be 
clearly distinguished from prohibition against assumption of jurisdiction in 
the first instance."ll2 
A stay has been denied also where a bill of lading provided that all 
controversies should be referred to the Court of Trieste with exclusive 
jurisdiction.113 
In view of the strict construction given by the federal courts to the 
United States Arbitration Act, it is obvious that their attitude with ' 
reference to agreements for arbitration not falling within the Act re-
mains as it was before the passage of the federal Act.114 
England. Dicey states that "at one time effect would not be given to 
arbitration clauses in contracts, wherever made, as ousting the jurisdic-
tion of the courts in England."110 Although no early English cases in-
volving the conflict of laws have been found, the English courts no doubt 
would have declined to enforce foreign contracts for arbitration as being 
opposed to the public policy of England. The attitude of the English 
courts was changed, however, as a result of the early adoption of the 
English arbitration acts recognizing arbitration agreements as valid and 
irrevocable. In the leading case of Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distil-
lery,116 an agreement was entered into in England between a Scottish 
concern and a London company for the sale and purchase of grain to 
be delivered in Scotland. The contract contained the following clause: 
112. Supra note 88, at 327-328. 
113. American Tobacco Co. v. Lloyd Triestino Societa di Navigazione, 1 A. M. C. 
1135 (1928). 
114. A federal court sitting in California has therefore no jurisdiction to compel the 
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the California Arbitration Act, where 
the parties agreed that the disputes should be settled by arbitration in California. In 
reaching the above conclusion in California Prune and Apricot Growers' Association v. 
Catz American Co., supra note 101, Judge Sawtelle made the following points: (1) the diffi-
culty, if not impossibility, of harmonizing the California Arbitration Act with the federal 
law and procedure; (2) the federal courts are without power to enforce purely remedial 
or procedural state laws; (3) the Conformity Act (28 U. S. C. § 724) does not govern 
if the case is in the nature of an equity suit and thus excepted fmm the Conformity Act; 
(4) the case does not fall within the Rules of Decision Act (28 U. S. C. § 725), which 
refers only to substantive law. 
In the earlier case of Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Co., 25 F. (2d) 930 (C. C. A. 
9th, 1928), the court had granted a stay, but the question of the jurisdiction of the 
federal court to enforce the local state statute had not been raised nor considered in 
that case_. 
See also the discussion of the subject by Baum and Pressman, supra note 100, at 447 
et seq. 
115. DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws (5th ed., Keith 1932) 632 n. 
116. [1894] A. C. 202. 
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"Should any dispute arise out of this contract, the same to be settled 
by arbitration by two members of the London Corn Exchange, or their 
umpire, in the usual way." It was contended that the law of Scotland, 
where the contract of sale was to be performed, should govern, and that 
the clause was invalid in Scotland for failure to ·name the arbitrators. 
But the House of Lords reversed the decision of the Scottish court which 
had held the law of Scotland applicable, Lord Hershell declaring: 
"In considering what law is to govern, no doubt the lex loci solutionis is a 
matter of great importance. The lex loci contractus is also of importance . . . 
In my view they are both matters which must be taken into consideration, 
but neither of them is, of itself, conclusive, and still less is it conclusive, as it 
appears to me, as to the particular law which was intended to govern particu-
lar parts of the contract between the parties. In this case, as in all such cases, 
the whole of the contract must be looked at and the rights under it must be 
regulated by the intention of the parties as appearing from the contract . . . 
Now in the present case it appears to me that the language of the arbitration 
clause indicates very clearly that the parties intended that the rights under 
that clause should be determined according to the law of England .. .U7 
"But then it is argued that an agreement to refer disputes to arbitration 
deals with the remedy and not with the rights of the parties, and that conse-
quently the forum being Scotch the parties cannot by reason of the agreement 
into which they have entered interfere with the ordinary course of proceed-
ings in the courts of Scotland . . . But the preliminary question has to be 
determined whether by virtue of a valid clause of arbitration the proper course 
is for the Courts of Scotland not to adjudicate upon the merits of the case, 
but to leave the matter to be determined by the tribunal to which the parties 
have agreed to refer it. Viewed in that light, I can see no difficulty; and the 
argument that to give effect to this arbitration clause would interfere with the 
course of procedure in the forum in which the action is pending seems to me 
entirely to fail."118 
The case of Spurrier v. La Cloche,119 decided by the Privy Council, 
likewise rejected the lex fori in favor of the intention of the parties, and 
stayed an action upon an insurance policy in Jersey on the basis of a 
stipulation for arbitration made there but providing for arbitration in 
accordance with the English Arbitration Act. 
From the standpoint of the conflict of laws, therefore, the validity of 
a foreign contract for arbitration is determined with reference to the 
law governing contracts. If a valid arbitral contract has been entered 
into in conformity with such rule, and suit is brought in England with 
reference to the matter to be submitted to arbitration, the English courts 
117. Id. at 207-208. 
118. Id. at 210. 
119. [1902] A. C. 446. 
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"maym20 grant a stay of proceedings. The granting of the stay is within 
the discretion of the court.121 A stay has been allowed also where an 
English contract called for arbitration abroad and suit was brought in 
England with reference to the matter in dispute.122 Where a stay has 
been prayed by a non-resident foreigner, the order granting it has 
been made on the condition that he give security for the costs of the 
arbitration.123 An agreement to submit disputes to a foreign court is 
held to be an arbitration agreement within the English Arbitration Act, 
entitling a party, in the absence of good reasons to the contrary, to an 
order staying an action brought in England contrary to the agreement.12" 
In Kirchner v. Gruban/25 the court, holding that such an order should 
be granted at defendant's request, required the defendant to give an 
undertaking or bond that he would submit to the jurisdiction of the 
foreign tribunal. The above cases were decided before the enactment 
of the Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) Act, 1924, which, in those cases 
where it is applicable, apparently deprives the court of all discretion in 
the matter of granting a stay.126 
The English law contents itself with granting a stay, but, it seems, 
never orders the parties to proceed to arbitration. Lord Justice Fletcher-
Moulton, in summarizing the present English law, states: 
"The parties could not be compelled to go to arbitration. They cannot 
now; but an appeal to the courts can be stopped, and that indirectly enforces 
the arbitration clause. Therefore the status of an arbitration clause in England 
is that it will not be specifically enforced, but by proper proceedings you can 
prevent the other party from appealing to the English courts in respect of 
any matter which by contract ought to be decided by arbitration.11127 
120. ARB:ci:RA.noN Acr (1889) § 1. 
121. RussELL, op. cit. supra note 36, at 104 et seq. No discretion seems to exist under 
the corresponding provisions of the Scotch Act. Crawford Brothers v. Commissioners 
of Northern Lighthouses, [1925] S. C. (H. L.) 22. 
122. The Dawlish, [1910] P. D. 339. 
123. In re Bjornstad and the Ouse Shipping Co., [1924] 2 K. B. 673. 
124. Law v. Garrett, 8 Ch. Div. 26 (1878) ; Austrian Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Gresham 
Life Assurance Society, [1903] 1 K. B. 249; The Cap Blanco, [1913] P. D. 130. 
125. [1909] 1 Ch. 413. 
126. Under the Act of 1924, the court "shall" make an order staying the proceedings. 
See RussELL, op. cit. supra note 36, at 519. 
127. Pena Copper Mines Ltd. v. Rio Tinto Co. Ltd., 105 L. T. 846, 852 (1911). But 
although the English courts do not specifically enforce the reference to arbitration and 
will not grant an injunction which would have the same effect [RussELL, op. cit. supra 
note 36, at 73], such injunction was granted in the above case to restrain a suit in a for-
eign country in violation of an arbitration agreement under the following facts. An 
agreement was made between an English company and a Belgian company, both doing 
business in Spain, for the construction of a railway. The contract stated that it should be 
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To what extent the local provisions for appointment of arbitrators and 
supervision of the arbitral proceedings are applicable to agreements made 
outside of England, and specifying either no place for performance or 
a foreign place, does not appear from the English cases. It is doubtless 
safe to assume that if there is an express stipulation for arbitration under 
the English law, the English Act will apply in toto although the agree-
ment may have been made in another country. 
France. As indicated above,128 before the French legislation of De, 
cember 31, 1925, the local French law refused to recognize the validity 
of an arbitration agreement which did not indicate the objects in dispute 
and the names of the arbitrators, as required by Article 1006 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. This article refers to agreements to submit existing 
disputes to arbitration (the so-called compromis), but it became the 
settled French law that this article applied likewise to clauses in con-
tracts providing for the arbitration of future disputes (clause com-
promissoire). By virtue of Article 332 of the Commercial Code an 
exception existed in matters of marine insurance where arbitration of 
future disputes is recognized. The early decisions made no distinction 
between transactions local in character and those involving international 
elements. · Such arbitral clauses were therefore regarded as void, irre-
spective of their place of making or performance, or of the nationality 
of the parties. Article 1006 was regarded as laying down a rule of inter-
national public order, which precluded the recognition under any circum-
stances of the validity of agreements for the arbitration of future dis-
putes. Hence suit might be brought before any French court with 
respect to matters included in an arbitration agreement entered into 
in a foreign country between foreigners or between a Frenchman and 
a foreigner, without regard to the fact that it was a valid agreement 
under the law of the place where made.129 The later cases, however, 
abandoned this strict policy and recognized the validity of these agree-
ments.130 The reason given for recognition was in both cases the prin-
construed and given effect as a contract made in England and in accordance with the law 
of England, that any disputes arising under the contract were to be referred to arbitration 
in conformity with the provisions of the English Arbitration Act of 1889, and that the 
award was to be a condition precedent to any liability of either party on the contract. The 
court held that it had power to restrain the suit abroad and that its power should be exer-
cised under the facts of the case. 
128. See p. 721, supra. 
129. 3 LAPRADELI.E AND NmoYET, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1929) 449, no. 4. 
130. App. Poitiers, Oct. 28, 1907, (1908) 35 Cr.UNET 460; App. Alger, Dec. 27, 1907, 
(1910) 37 Cr.UNET 538; App. Rouen, May 6, 1908, (1909) 5 REvuE 178; App. Paris, 
Nov. 7, 1913, (1917) 44 Cr.UNET 590; App. Caen, Dec. 23, 1915, (1918) 45 CLUNET 180. 
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ciple of the autonomy of the will. Such agreements, when made in 
France between two foreigners or between a foreigner and a Frenchman, 
were recognized as valid if the arbitration was to take place abroad, or 
the parties intended that the contract should be governed by foreign 
law.l31 
Logically, under the principle of autonomy of the will, an agreement 
made in France between two Frenchmen should have been recognized 
as valid, if the parties clearly manifested their intention to submit the 
contract to a foreign law. The courts hesitated, however, to recognize 
the validity of a clause of this kind under these circumstances, but the 
Court of Cassation132 has recently declared that such an agreement would 
be upheld in a proper case.133 
The law of December 31, 1925, purports to authorize stipulations for 
the arbitration of future disputes in commercial matters. As this legis~ 
lation lacks any detailed provisions134 it leaves in doubt many matters 
connected with commercial arbitration, both from a local and interna-
tional point of view.135 But, although constituting an amendment to 
131. Cass. (Req.) July 17, 1899, (1899) 26 CLUNET 1024; App. Besancon, Jan. 5, 
1910, (1910) 37 CLUNET 857; Trib. Civ. Lyon, July 30, 1913, (1914) 41·CLUNET 901; 
Ca..<S. (Req.) Jan. 8, 1924, (1924) 51 CLUNET 974; App. Aix, Nov. 3, 1930, (1931) 26 
REvuE 308. 
132. Cass. (Civ.) Feb. 19, 1930, 25 REvuE 282 (1930), 26 id. 514 (1931). 
133. See in general, Perreau, De la Validite de la Clause Compromissoire inseree dans 
un Contrat passe d L'Etranger (1910) 37 CLUNET 787; GonRON, op. cit. supra note 56; 
La Clause Compromissoire dans les Rapports Intemationaux devant les Tribunaux Fran,ais 
(1919) 46 CLUNET 57, 654, Picard, La Clause Compromissoire et L'Arbz"trage dans les Rap-
ports Internationaux (1923) 50 CLUNET 508; Andre-Prudhomme, supra note 29. 
134. The law consists of a single article and reads: 
"Art. 631 of the Commercial Code is modified as follows: The courts of commerce 
are competent in the following cases: 
"1. Controversies relating to transactions between merchants and bankers. 
"2. Controversies between partners of a commercial company. 
"3. Controversies relating to commercial matters between all persons. 
"The parties may, however, at the time of concluding the contract agree to submit to 
arbitrators any of the controversies above enumerated, should such controversies arise 
in the future." 1 NussBAUM 203. 
See Palewski, L'Arbitrage en Matiere Commerdale et la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Cas-
sation (1933) 60 CLUNET 845; Hamel, La Clause Compromissoire dans les Rapports 
de Commerce lntemationaux, (1922-23) 18 REVUE 721; LANDRAU, L'ARBITRAGE DANS LE 
DROIT ANGLAIS ET FRANc;AIS CoMPARES (1932) 88 et seq.; Andre-Prudhomme, supra note 29. 
135. For example, is the Act applicable where one of the parties is a foreigner? Pro-
fessor Andre-Prudhomme is of the opinion that the French courts will give an affirmative 
answer. Supra note 29, at 70-71. 
A decision of the Appellate Court of Ab: concluded that an agreement to arbitrate 
was not binding under the law of 1925 unless it was entered into formally. App. Ai.,., 
March 2, 1929-, Gaz. Pal. 1929, 2, 704, cited in 60 CLUNET 852. The law has been set-
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Article 631 of the Commercial Code dealing with the jurisdiction of the 
French courts of commerce, it is not regarded as a procedural law and 
is therefore not applicable to contracts entered into prior to its enact-
ment.136 
The jurisdiction of French courts with respect to the person is held 
to be a matter of privilege established in the interest of the individual, 
which may be renounced by contract or otherwise.137 Consequently, 
French courts recognize and enforce contracts conferring exclusive juris-
diction upon foreign courts, and any action brought in France in viola-
tion of such agreement will be dismissed. In a late case the Court of 
Cassation stated: 
"Article 14 of the Civil Code, according to the terms of which a foreigner 
may be sued before the French courts on account of obligations contracted by 
him in a foreign country with respect to a Frenchman, is not a disposition 
of public policy, and may be waived by the interested parties."138 
Belgium. Differing from the earlier French attitude, the Belgian 
courts have declined to recognize contracts for the arbitration of future 
disputes (clause compromissoire) as being governed by Article 1006 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifically refers only to the 
submission of existing disputes ( compromis) .139 Agreements for arbi-
tration are governed, therefore, from the standpoint of the conflict of 
laws, by the ordinary rules applicable to contracts. 
Germany. In view of the fact that agreements to arbitrate future 
disputes have been recognized throughout Germany since the adoption 
of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877, it has become the established 
law that a valid arbitration agreement will constitute a defense to any 
suit brought in Germany in violation of such agreement.140 In con-
nection with this defense the courts will determine only whether the 
subject-matter of the suit falls within the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment; when this appears the court must dismiss the suit.141 
tled, however, in a contrary sense by the Court of Cassation. Cass. (Civ.) June 9, 1933, 
D. H. 1933, 164. 
136. LA.l'IDRAU, op. cit. suPra note 134, at 91-93. There have been some differences of 
view on the subject. But there is no suggestion that the proponents of the procedural 
view as regards retroactivity would regard the statute in the same light from the· stand-
point of the conflict of laws, so as to apply the le."!: fori to foreign contracts. 
137. See NmoYET, MANuEL DE DRoiT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (2d ed. Pillet & Niboyet, 
1928) nos. 770, 780, 784. 
138. Cass. (Req.) June 19, 1928, (1929) 56 CLUNET 336, 337. 
139. Cass. Belg. June 8, 1849, PAs. 1850, pt. 1, 81; GonRoN, op. cit. suPra note 56, at 
94-95n. 
140. ConE Crv. P&oc. § 274, par. 2, no. 3. 
141. OLG Munich, Oct. 4, 1911, 25 OLG 94. 
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The law governing the validity of the arbitration agreement is not 
clearly defined.142 There is accord, however, on the point that not-
withstanding the fact that some of the requirements for the validity 
~f agreements for arbitration are contained in the Code of Civil 
Procedure, they are substantive in character. Contrary to the Berko-
witz case, the Supreme Court of Germany has held that the provisions 
of the German Code of Civil Procedure relating to the validity of agree-
ments for arbitration were not applicable to contracts entered into be-
fore the Code went into effect.143 
The question whether an order can be had compelling the defendant 
to proceed to arbitration does not appear in any of the reported deci-
sions that have been found. In view of the fact, however, that under 
German law the remedy of specific performance of contracts is the 
normal one/44 it would seem that it should be available for the breach 
of arbitration contracts. But where suit is brought in a foreign coun-
try in violation of an agreement for arbitration, the German courts 
have no jurisdiction to grant an injunction.145 Neither do the German 
courts have the power to appoint an arbitrator where the contract calls 
for arbitration in a foreign country.146 
The rules relating to jurisdiction over the person are regarded in 
Germany also as laid down for the benefit of individuals, and may be 
waived by them. Contracts conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon for-
eign courts are therefore recognized on principle as valid.147 
142. See Supreme Court, Nov. 8, 1882, 27 GRuc:a:OT 1053. 
To the effect that the law governing the award should control, see Jonas, Anerkenmmg 
und VoUstreckung ausliindischer Schiedsspruche JW (1927); 2 STEIN-JoNAS, DIE ZIVIL-
PROZESSORDNUNG FUR DAS DEUTSCHE REic:a: (14th ed., Jonas, 1929) 1085. 
To the effect that the validity of the arbitration clause depends upon the law governing 
the main contract, at least in case of doubt where the main contract is void, see Neuner, 
Zum Problem der ausliindischen Schiedsspruclze, 3 ZEITsCHRIFT FiiR AUSLANDISCB:ES UND 
INTI:RNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1929) 43, n. 6; also, Nussbaum, supra note 74, at 17 
.et seq. 
143. Supreme Court, Nov. 10, 1881, 38 SA 158. 
144. See CIV. CoDE § 249. 
145. Kabn, Arbitration in England and Germany (1930) J. CoMP. LEG. 228, 241. 
146. OLG Rostrock, Sept. 23, 1915, 33 OLG 140. Where there is an express agree-
ment that the arbitration shall be held in. Germany and is to be subject to German Law, 
or the parties have deemed to have contracted with reference to German law, the German 
provisions relating to the appointment of arbitrators are applicable, without reference to 
the law of the domicil or to the national law of the contracting parties. OLG Hamburg, 
May 27, 1914, 29 OLG 283. 
147. OLG Colmar, March 31, 1903, 6 OLG 384; OLG Dresden, May 30, 1904, 9 
OLG 51; see also Supreme Court, May 16, 1926, JW (1926) 1336, and KG, Feb. 6, 1926, 
JW (1926) 1353; Lorenzen, The Conflict of Laws of Germany (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 804, 
825-827. 
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Italy. Article 69 of the Italian Code of CiVil Procedure provides that 
"The jurisdiction [of courts] cannot be prorogued by the parties, except 
in the cases established by law." The rules governing jurisdiction are 
regarded as matters of public policy, involving the sovereignty of the 
state and the freedom of individuals. Any contract attempting to oust 
the jurisdiction of the Italian courts is therefore null and void. This 
has been held to be true even where the contract was "one between two 
Italians contracting abroad.148 The same conclusion has been reached 
in the case of contracts made in Italy between an Italian and a for-
eigner.140 A minority holding considers a stipulation conferring juris-
diction on a foreign court as invalid only in cases with respect to which 
the Italian courts have exclusive jurisdiction.150 It is recognized, on 
the other hand, that foreigners may confer jurisdiction on the Italian 
courts in cases other than those specified in Articles 105-106 of the 
Italian Code of Civil Procedure.151 
Agreements for arbitration in a foreign country have given rise to 
much contrariety of view among the Italian courts. These differences 
result in part from antagonistic theories entertained by Italian writers 
and courts concerning the nature of arbitration agreements.152 Prior 
to the decree of July 20, 1919, .the courts were practically unanimous in 
holding such agreements for foreign arbitration to be invalid where the 
contract containing the arbitral clause was between Italian subjects 
and was to be performed in Italy.m No agreement existed where both 
parties were foreigners or one of the parties an Italian and the other 
a foreigner. Some courts held such agreements for arbitration to be 
148. App. Milan, Apr. 23, 1927, (1928) Rrv. Dm. INT 110. 
149. Cass. del Regno, March 16, 1926, (1926) Rrv. Dm. INT. 385; March 15, 1927, 
(1927) Rrv. Dm. INT. 389; Camelutti, Clausole di Rinunzia alla Giurisdizione Italiana 
(1923) 89 ARCli. GIUR. 172. 
150. App. Naples, Feb. 13, 1925, (1925) Rrv. Dm. INT. 546; Cavaglieri, Lezioni di 
Diritto Intemazionale Privato (3d ed. 1933) 368; Rocco eli Torrepadula, La Proroga della 
Giurisdizione Italiana nel Diritto Internazionale Processuale (1932) Rrv. IT. Dm. INT. PRIV. & 
PROC. 553. 
151. Cass. Jan. 24, 1927, (1928) Rrv. Dm. INT. 249. 
152. Some courts draw inferences from Art. 22, Code of Civ. Proc., providing that 
arbitration awards must be pronounced in Italy. Others rely on Arts. 105-106 of the 
Code of Civ. Proc. specifying the instances in which the Italian courts have jurisdiction 
over foreigners. 
153. Cass. Turin, Sept. 9, 1914, (1914) MoN. 844 (not clear where to be performed); 
May 17, 1918, (1918) MoN. 369; June 6, 1919, (1919) MoN. 814; June 17, 1919, (1919) 
MoN. 421. App. Milan, Oct. 23, 1917, (1918) MoN. 49; July 30, 1918, (1918) MoN. 569. 
Cass. del Regno, Apr. 8, 1927, (1927) Rrv. Dm. INT. 387 (contract made in Italy and to 
be performed partly in Italy and partly abroad). But see. Cass. Palermo, Feb. 23, 1912, 
(1912) MoN. 752. 
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valid; 154 others that they were valid only if the agreement was made or 
to be performed abroad or if the parties had their domicil abroad.um 
The 1919 decree authorized the enforcement of foreign awards between 
foreigners or between an Italian and a foreigner, but denied recognition 
to foreign awards between two Italian subjects. The question whether it 
validated by implication agreements for arbitration between an Italian 
and a foreigner where the contract was made in Italy and called for arbi-
tration abroad, was further complicated by the Geneva Protocol on Arbi-
tration Clauses. This Protocol, adopted September 24, 1923, provided 
for the recognition of agreements for arbitration between parties belong-
ing to different Contracting States, whether or not the arbitration was to 
take place in a third country. Although ratified by Italy on July 28, 1924, 
it was not enacted into law until May 8, 1927, and the issue arose as to 
whether the new policy indicated by the previous ratification might be 
taken into consideration by the Italian courts prior to the establishment 
of the Protocol as positive law.106 During this period, 1919-1927, the deci-
sions of the Italian courts were in a state of great confusion, those of 
the Court of Cassation of the Kingdom being themselves inconsistent 
with one another.157 
That the law of May 8, 192 7, has not changed the Italian attitude 
with regard to agreements for arbitration in general but exerts only a 
limited influence with respect to the Contracting States, is indicated by 
a recent decision of the United Chambers of the Court of Cassation of the 
154. Cass. Rome, Feb. 5, 1909, (1909) MoN. 645; App. Milan, Sept. 23, 1913, (1914) 
MoN. 135 (centract made or to be performed in Italy); App. Milan, Feb. 27, 1917, (1917) 
MoN. 782 (contract to be performed in Italy). 
155. App. Milan, July 30, 1918, (1918) MoN. 569 (valid where domicil abroad); Cass. 
Turin, June 17, 1919, (1919) MoN. 421 (invalid if to be performed in Italy); App. Genoa, 
June 17, 1922, (1923) MoN. 507 (invalid if to be performed in Italy); Cass. Turin, Aug. 
30, 1923, (1924) MoN. 87 (valid where part performance abroad). 
156. See Sereni, Sulfa Validita e gli Effetti della Clattsola Compromissoria per Arbitrato 
Estero (1931) Rrv. Dm.. !NT. 394; Betti, Sttlla Validita della Clausola Compromissoriu per 
Arbitrato Estero Secondo il Diritto Italiano (1927) 2 Rrv. Dm.. PRoc. CIV. 266. 
157. In favor of validity: Cass. del Regno, Nov. 10, 1926, (1927) MoN. 20-1-; Apr. 22, 
1927, (1927) Rrv. Dm.. INT. 388; May 18, 1927, (1927) MoN. 561; June 4, 1929, (1929) 
54 REP. FoRO IT., under Arbitramento, no. 5. 
Against validity: Cass. Regno, March 16, 1925, 1 NussBAUM 336; Apr. 8, 1927, (1927) 
. Rrv. DI Dm.. INT. 387. 
See note by Ascarelli, 2 NussBAm.t 333; Betti, sttpra note 156. 
An agreement entered into in Italy between an Italian and a citizen of Switzerland for 
submission to foreign arbitration is valid under the Geneva Protocol of 1923, although 
the Swiss was a resident of Italy, Italy and Switzerland having both adhered to the Geneva 
Protocol. Cass. del Regno, March 15, 1932, (1932) 57 FoRo. IT. 1932, pt. 1, 538, and note 
by Cavaglieri. • 
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Kingdom.1ti8 The question arose with respect to a contract for arbitration 
entered into by an Italian and a Brazilian, calling for arbitration in 
Brazil. The Appellate Court of Naples held the contract valid, not-
withstanding the fact that the Geneva Protocol had not been ratified 
by BraziJ.ltiO But the highest court reversed the decision, on the ground 
that the Italian law had been modified only within the limits of the 
Protocol, that is, with respect to nationals whose countries had ratified 
the Geneva Protocol. 
The law governing the validity of arbitration agreements is discussed 
by the Court of Cassation of the Kingdom160 in a case in which the con-
tract was made in Italy between an Italian and a Brazilian firm and 
provided for arbitration in Italy. The Court said: 
"The law of the country where this arbitration agreement was concluded 
applies without doubt to its validity, as follows from Article 9 of the Intro-
ductory Provisions to the Code of Civil Procedure."161 
It was held that the agreement was invalid under Italian law. 
Sweden. Of particular interest are the provisions of the conflict of 
laws adopted in Sweden by the Law of June 14, 1929.162 Under them, 
if a suit is brought in Sweden on a dispute falling within a valid agree-
ment for arbitration, the action will be dismissed.163 It matters not 
whether the agreement for arbitration may be regarded as a Swedish 
one or a foreign one. Where the agreement for arbitration specifies 
the place where the arbitration is to take place, the law of that state or 
country will determine the validity and effect of the agreement.164 
Where the place of arbitration does not appear, Swedish law will ap-
parently govern if both parties, or one of them, is domiciled in Sweden.160 
158. Jan. 22, 1931, {1931) Rl:v. Dm. INT. 392, and note by Sereni, {1931) Rl:v. IT. Dm. 
INT. Pruv. & PROC. 185, and note by Cereti. 
159. App. Naples, July 22, 1929, 3 NussBAUM 385. 
160. Cass. del Regno, Jan. 28, March 16, 1925, 1 NussBAUM 336. 
161. Id. at 337. Art. 9 of the Introductory Provisions to the Italian Civil Code pro-
vides as follows: 
"The substance and effects of obligations are governed by the law of the place in which 
the acts were done, and, if the parties have the same nationality, by their national law; 
excepting in each case proof of a will to the contrary." 
Art. 13 of the Draft of the New Italian Code contains the following provision: "Obliga-
tions arising from contracts are governed by the law to which the parties have expressly 
referred. In the absence of an express declaration that law will control which the parties 
are presumed to have chosen in view of the provisions of the contract and the surround-
ing circumstances." 
162. The text may be found in German in 3 NussBAUM 269, 274 §§ 1-4. 
163. Id. § 3. 
164. Id. § 2. 
165. Id. § 4. 
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If both parties are domiciled outside of Sweden, the rule of the conflict 
of laws governing the validity and effect of the agreement· is not indi-
cated, but recognition of the foreign arbitral agreement, valid under 
the proper law, wili be refused in Sweden on grounds of public policy, 
if the dispute is one that could not be submitted to arbitration under 
the local Swedish law.166 
Proceedings for arbitration may be instituted in Sweden and the aid 
of the Swedish courts obtained if arbitration is to take place in Sweden; 
so also where the agreement does not specify the country in which arbi-
tration is to take place, if both parties or one of the parties is domi-
ciled in Sweden. If only one of the parties has his domicil in Sweden 
at the time of the making of the agreement, or has established his 
domicil there subsequently thereto, proceedings can be brought in 
Sweden against the party domiciled therein, but not against the other 
party.167 
It seems therefore that where the contract calls for arbitration abroad, 
the Swedish courts will not entertain jurisdiction to compel the parties 
to proceed to arbitration, nor to appoint an arbitrator; nor will they do 
so where the contract is silent with respect to the place of arbitration 
and suit is instituted against a party who is domiciled in some coun-
try other than Sweden. 
Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses. This Protocol, signed at 
Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations, on September 24, 
1923, seeks to facilitate international arbitration in civil and commercial 
matters.168 Although it provides for the recognition of agreements to arbi-
trate both existing and future disputes, "whether or not the arbitration 
is to take place in a country to whose jurisdiction none of the parties 
is subject," it is for some seemingly insufficient reason limited by Arti-
cle 1 to parties of different Contracting States and does not include 
agreements between nationals of one Contracting State for arbitration 
in some other Contracting State. Moreover, a Contracting State can 
under Article 1, paragraph 2, stipulate for a limitation of the Protocol 
as to it to commercial contracts and a number of ratifying nations have 
taken advantage of this reservation.169 
The Protocol does not specify what law should determine the validity 
of agreements for arbitration. The arbitral proceedings themselves, 
however, including the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, are, under 
166. Id. § 3. 
167. ARBITRATION LAWS, stt:Pra note 61, § 4. 
168. League of Nations Publications II, Economic and Financial, (1928) no. 5. The 
text may be found also in RusSELL, op. cit. suPra note 36, at 517; 1 NussBAUM 239. 
169. 1 NussBAUM 239. 
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Article 2, governed by the law of the country in whose territory the 
arbitration is to take place, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.170 
The object of the Protocol, which has now been ratified by Great 
Britain and nearly all of the continental countries,171 was to prevent 
any action from being brought in any Contracting State between na-
tionals of different Contracting States on a contract containing an arbi-
tration clause. According to Article 4, if a suit is brought contrary 
to the terms of the agreement, the court shall refer the parties to the 
decision of the arbitrators, except in the case where the arbitration can-
not proceed or has become inoperative. The duty to enforce awards 
under the Act is limited to local awards.172 The enforcement of awards 
of other Contracting States is provided for in the Geneva Convention 
on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, of September 26, 1927.173 
IV 
Arbitration Law-Substantive or Procedural? 
The foregoing account, though confined to the law of a .few of the 
leading commercial countries of the world, gives some conception of 
the present complexity of the law governing commercial arbitration in 
its international and interstate aspects. Not only are there wide differ-
ences among the individual continental countries, but also between Eng-
land and the United States. One thing stands out above all else, namely, 
that from the standpoint of the conflict of laws the attitude of the 
United States toward commercial arbitration is not shared by any other 
country, not even Great Britain. The dominant point of view in our 
law is that agreements for arbitration relate to procedure or remedy. 
Judge Cardozo gave prominence to this view in his concurring opin-
ion in the Meacham case,174 and in voicing for the majority of the court 
in Matter of Berkowitz v. Arbib & Houlberg175 the opinion that the 
New York Arbitration Act was procedural in character. The New York 
Act has also been held to be procedural by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.176 The problem be-
fore the Supreme Court was whether agreements for arbitration of dis-
putes arising under maritime contracts (a charter party) were within the 
scope of the New York Arbitration statute, and whether, if so construed 
170. Art. 2. 
171. 1 NussBAUM 239; 2 NussBAUM 237; 3 NussBAUM 301. 
172. Art. 3. 
173. 2 NUSSBAUM 237. 
174. Sttpra note 79. 
175. Sttpra note 82. 
176. Sttpra note 100. 
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and applied, the state law conflicted with the Constitution of the United 
States. In holding that the controversy was not within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of admiralty and that the New York courts had the power 
to compel the charter owner to proceed to arbitration, Mr. Justice Bran-
deis made the follo·wing observations: "The Arbitration Law (of New 
York) deals merely with the remedy in the state courts in respect of 
obligations voluntarily and lawfully incurred. It does not attempt either 
to modify the substantive maritime law or to deal with the remedy in 
courts of admiralty.77177 Clearly, the Supreme Court was of the opinion 
that the application of the New York Arbitration Act to maritime law 
would not interfere with the "uniformity doctrine" established by a 
majority of the Supreme Court in the Jensen case.178 
No .issues in the conflict of laws were presented either in Matter of 
Berkowitz v. Arbib & Houlberg or in Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit 
Co. In the former the question before the court was one of the retro-
spective application of the New York Arbitration Act. If the answer to 
this question, in the absence of an express declaration on the part of the 
legislature,.depended upon the "substantive" or "procedural" character 
of the legislation, it does not follow that the line drawn by the majority 
of the court should be the same for purposes of the conflict of laws. 
The mere fact that the majority labelled the statute as "procedural," 
in order to make it applicable to contracts entered into before the 
passage of the statute, should not cause the same label to be attached 
to the statute in connection with conflict of laws problems. Nor from 
the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States also regarded the 
New York Arbitration statute as procedural so far as the "uniformity 
doctrine" in admiralty is concerned, does it necessarily follow that it 
should be so classified from the standpoint of the conflict of laws.l7° 
Professor Cook has called attention in a recent article180 to the con-
fusion caused by attaching the label "substantive" or "procedural" with-
out reference to the type of question before the court. The mere fact 
that a statute has been held procedural for one purpose does not make 
it incumbent upon the court to attach to it the same construction for some 
other purpose. Professor Cook enumerates eight groups of cases in 
connection with which the problem ma:y arise and with respect to them 
says: 
177. ld. at 124. 
178. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
179. In a number of cases in which arbitration statutes were held to be procedural the 
immediate issue before the court was the enforceability of a state arbitration statute by 
the federal courts, which is again a problem by itself. 
180. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 
333. 
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"Only after the most careful consideration ought it to be concluded that 
decisions relating to one of these problems are to be followed as 'precedents' 
for the decision of cases in another group. This is not to say that they ought 
to have no weight at all; far from it. It is merely to point out that at most 
they make out a prima facie case, and even that is perhaps to overstate the 
case for their use as precedents in really doubtful cases involving different pur-
poses.msl 
Attention has been called elsewhere182 to the fact that Anglo-American 
courts have been inclined to give too wide a meaning in the conflict of 
laws to the term "procedure." Difference of opinion may fairly exist 
with regard to the line which should be drawn in some instances between 
procedure and substance. For example, the statute of limitations is 
generally regarded in Anglo-American Law as procedural and in con-
tinental countries as substantive. American courts disagree as to 
whether the statute of frauds should be deemed procedural or 
substantive. The same disagreement e...Qsts also with respect to pre-
sumptions and the burden of proof. Much confusion could have been 
avoided if our courts had followed Professor Cook's suggestion that 
the line between substance and procedure should be consciously drawn 
with especial reference to the purpose to be sought. Another source 
of confusion in this country results from the fact that the "procedural" 
and public policy arguments are frequently used interchangeably. Where 
the local law of the forum has severer requirements than that of the 
foreign state or country, the result obtained is, of course, the same; 
but fundamentally different conclusions are reached where the require-
ments of the law of the forum are less severe or simply different from 
those of the state or country in which the cause of action had its origin. 
In this situation the parties may have no right or cause of action under 
the law of the foreign state or country but would have one by the lex 
fori; or the reverse may be true, that is, the· parties may have a right 
by the law of the foreign state or country and none by the law of the 
forum, when the differences of law are not of such a fundamental char-
acter that the public policy argument would be available from the . 
standpoint of the conflict of laws. 
The arbitration statutes thus present two problems, first, whether 
from the point of view of the conflict of laws they should be classified 
as procedural; and, second, if they are not procedural, to what extent, 
if any, effect may be denied them on the ground that their recognition 
and enforcement would conflict with the public policy of the forum. 
181. Id. at 344. 
182. Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 
311. 
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At the time of the decision of the Meacham case, common-law agree-
ments for arbitration were not enforceable in this country, except in 
Pennsylvania. Hence it is not surprising that the New York Court 
of Appeals was of the unanimous opinion that the Ohio contract, which 
was to be wholly performed in Pennsylvania, could not be recognized 
in New York. As agreements for arbitration would "oust the jurisdic-
tion of the courts," and such agreements were regarded practically uni-
versally in this country as opposed to public policy, it was natural that 
such policy should be held to extend to foreign contracts, enforceable 
by the proper law. 
But if the public policy argument had been the only one to prevent 
the enforcement of the foreign contract in the Meacham case, a different 
result would be reached today in New York as a result of the Arbitration 
Act of 1920, which has changed the policy of that state with respect 
to arbitration. In states retaining the revocability doctrine, the question 
would be whether their local policy should be regarded as still of such 
paramount importance that it should prevent the recognition and en~ 
forcement of agreements for arbitration made elsewhere and valid under 
the proper law, or whether in view of the modern general trend in favor 
of arbitration the local point of view should yield in favor of the larger 
policy of giving effect to agreements for commercial arbitration.183 If 
a foreign contract for the submission of future disputes to arbitration, 
valid where made, should come before the courts of a state which has 
no modern statute authorizing such agreements but which regards the 
submission of existing disputes as irrevocable, it would seem that the 
public policy argument against the enforcement or recognition of the 
agreement would be without solid foundation; for under these circum-
stances the difference between the two types of legislation should not 
be regarded as so fundamental as to make it a matter of public policy 
in the international sense. 
The problem assumes quite a different aspect if arbitration statutes 
are to be classified as procedural for conflict of laws purposes, and leads 
. the writer to conclude that they should not be so classified.184 It seems 
to him that too much stress has been laid on the argument that agree~ 
ments for arbitration were valid at common law and lacked only en~ 
183. Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 
198 (1918). 
184. See also Heilman, Arbitration Agreements and the Conflict of Laws (1929) 38 
YALE L. J. 617; Corbin, Conditional Rights and Functions of an Arbitrator (1928) 44 
L. Q. REv. 24; Baum and Pressman, supra note 100, at 449; and notes in (1928) 28 CoL. 
L. REv. 472; (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 1440; (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 801, 804; (1933) 47 
HARv. L. REv. 126, 315. ' 
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forceability which the modern statutes have supplied. Even from a 
technical point of view, it would seem a new right has been created 
instead of merely an additional remedy being added to an existing 
right. Formerly the contract was said to be "valid" but either party 
could withdraw from it at pleasure before the award was rendered; suit 
might be brought for damages, but these would normally be only nomi-
nal; whereas under the modern arbitration acts, the rights of the parties 
have become irrevocable. This transformation of a revocable right to 
one that is irrevocable must certainly be deemed to go to the substance 
instead of merely to the remedy. 
Ultimately the question should be answered from a broader point of 
view. With the enactment of the modern statutes favoring the arbitra-
tion of commercial disputes, the question bas become one of the atti-
tude which the courts will adopt toward this movement. Traditionally 
our courts have been opposed to arbitration agreements, but is there any 
sound reason why this attitude should be perpetuated notwithstanding 
the modern arbitration statutes? Why should arbitration agreements 
be singled out in the ~onfiict of laws from all other agreements and sub· 
jected to the local law of the forum? Other contracts made or to be 
performed in another state or country are governed by the proper law 
and, if valid, will be recognized and enforced, unless, under exceptional 
circumstances, such recognition and enforcement should violate the pub-
lic policy (in the international sense) of the forum. On the other band, 
if the contract is invalid by the proper law it will not be recognized 
and enforced by the law of the forum, notwithstanding the fact that 
under the local law the contract would be valid. Why should con-
tracts for arbitration form an exception to this rule? It is important 
from the standpoint of commercial arbitration that the rights of the 
parties should be governed by some definite law, instead of being de-
termined by the law of the state where the plaintiff may happen to bring 
the suit.185 Contracts to submit disputes to arbitration differ, of course, 
from other contracts in that the statutes applicable thereto contain 
procedural elements. But these are incident to the performance of the 
contract and not to its inception. So far as the validity of the contract 
is concerned, it should be dealt with from the same standpoint as are 
all other contracts. It should be governed by its proper law, which 
should be determined with reference to the peculiar requirements of 
this type of contract. This is the English point of view as expressed 
185. The confusion resulting from the lex fori doctrine appears very vividly from 
Phillips, supra note 97. 
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by Lord Herschell in Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery186 and it 
should be ours. 
Classification of arbitration statutes as procedural or remedial leads 
to positively harmful results. Prior to the modern arbitration acts the 
consequence of calling these statutes procedural was the refusal of our 
courts to recognize agreements for arbitration, valid and enforceable 
under the proper law. As the courts of practically all of our states were 
opposed to such agreements at that time, the result seemed to express 
the general policy of this country. Today the situation is greatly 
changed. In a dozen of our states, including the leading commercial 
states, arbitration agreements for the submission of future disputes are 
enforceable at the present time, the legislatures in these states having 
changed the policy formerly expressed by our courts. The logical effect 
of the view that these statutes are procedural would make the law of 
the forum applicable without regard to the law of the state or country 
where such contract was made or the arbitration was to take place. A 
contract for arbitration would be enforceable in New York, if personal 
service could be had on the defendant, although it was made and the 
arbitral tribunal was to sit in a state or country where the contract re-
mained unenforceable. In the absence of other considerations, a stay 
and an order to compel arbitration would be granted.187 And a contract 
for arbitration made in one of the states in which a modern arbitration 
'act exists and providing for arbitration in such a state would be unen-
forceable if the defendant lived in a state where such contracts are not 
enforceable and no jurisdiction could be had over him in a state having 
a modern act. In other words, the enforceability or unenforceability of 
the contract would depend primarily upon plaintiff's ability to obtain 
jurisdiction over the defendant in a state having a modern arbitration 
statute, without reference to the circumstances existing at the time of 
the making of the agreement. Provision in the arbitration statutes au-
thorizing ex parte arbitrations might enable the proceedings to continue 
though no personal service could be had over the other party, provided 
no appointment of arbitrators by the court was required.188 Courts fol-
lowing Leroux v. Brown/89 it is true, have reached this result, which the 
writer regards as untenable and improper/90 where the defense to a con-
tract was the statute of frauds. But however that may be, it is certain 
186. Supra note 116. 
187. The state courts have granted a stay but some have refused to order the parties 
to proceed to arbitration in another state. See pp. 731-732, supra. 
188. Phillips, supra note 97, at 222 et seq. (1934). 
189. 12 C. B. 801 (1852). 
190. Lorenzen, supra note 182, at 320 et seq. 
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that an ~xtension of the doctrine to· arbitration agreements would pre-
vent the proper development of commercial arbitration from an inter-
state and international point of view.191 The only proper and legitimate 
position is that the difference in the legislation on the subject of agree-
ments for arbitration is one relating to the substantive rights of the 
parties, aJ!.d that these contracts should be governed in the conflict of 
laws by their proper law, subject to the rules of public policy of the 
forum. This is the view accepted in England and in all other coun-
tries, including Italy, where th~ law is opposed on principle to stipula-
tions ousting the jurisdiction of the Italian courts. 
v 
The Governing Law 
Granted, then, that an agreement for arbitration creates substantive 
rights, the question arises as to what law should govern its validity from 
the standpoint of the conflict of laws. Is it to be governed by the in-
tention of the parties or by some fixed rule of law? , If the latter, is it 
to be determined by the law of the state or country where the contract 
is made, or where the arbitration is to take place, or is it to be controlled 
by the law of the common domicil or common nationality of the parties, 
or possibly by some other law? As far as ordinary contracts are con-
cerned, support can be found for any of these propositions.192 Most 
of the courts seem divided between the law of the place of contracting 
and the law of the place of performance. On the continent the state-
ment must be qualified by limiting it to matters affecting validity other 
than capacity and formalities. As regards capacity the personal law 
(generally the law of domicil or national law) controls, except that in 
commercial contracts a disability existing under the foreign personal 
law may be disregarded in the interest of commercial security if it 
does not exist under the locallaw.193 The contract is regarded as valid 
from the standpoint of formal requisites if it satisfies the law of the 
place of contracting.194 Frequently it is valid also if it complies with 
some other law, as for example in Germany19:.; the law of the place of 
performance. Much effort has been expended in the attempt to find 
a uniform rule applicable to all contracts, but it must be recognized 
191. Phillips, supra note 97, at 235-236. 
192. LORENZEN, Validity mzd Effects of C01ztracts in tlze Conflict of Laws (1921) 30 YALE 
L. J. 565. 
193. LORENZEN, CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1932) 333-335n. 
194. ld. at 345n. 
195. Ibid. 
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that this is futile and that the special requirements of particular con-
tracts should be considered. The fundamental requirement of our law 
at the present moment is that the rules of the conflict of laws which 
have been handed down to us shall be cast into a more liberal and flex-
ible mould in order that it may be possible for our courts to take into 
consideration all economic or social factors bearing upon the problem. 
Whether the case before the court contains conflict of laws elements 
or not, the ultimate goal is the same, namely, the reaching of a decision 
that will satisfy the sense of justice of t]le community. 
As regards arbitration agreements it would seem that where the 
parties have designated the place of arbitration, the courts should 
normally look to the law of the state or country so designated. It is 
highly desirable that an award that is properly rendered should be 
recognized and enforced in other countries. Now it is clear that in the 
very nature of things the law of the place where the arbitral court is to 
sit figures prominently in the matter of commercial arbitration. It 
will be binding upon the arbitrators, at all events as to any procedural 
matters not covered by the arbitration agreement. If judicial aid is 
required, such aid will of necessity be given in accordance with the law 
of that state. The award as such must satisfy the requirements of the 
law where it is rendered unless the parties have validly provided other-
wise. Convenience would suggest, therefore, that the validity of the 
arbitration agreement be regarded in general as subject to this law. Most 
of the writers who have given special attention to this problem have 
been forced to this conclusion, notwithstanding their divergent views 
regarding the law governing contracts in general.196 Sweden has ac-
cepted the same view by statute.197 It would seem that the law of the 
place of arbitration should also govern where such place, although not 
specifically designated by the parties, is ascertainable from the circum-
stances of the case.198 
But the question of the manner in which the validity of arbitration 
agreements is to be determined if the place of arbitration is not indi-
196. Note 142, supra. 
197. See p. 749, supra. , 
198. Under what circumstances, if any, it might be advisable to allow the courts to 
consult in addition some other law, such as the law of the place where the arbitration 
agreement was made, need not be discussed at this point. In continental law the ma:tim 
locus regit actum is firmly embedded, accorqing to which the validity of agreements is 
recognized, as regards formal requisites, if the lex loci contractus is satisfied. There would 
be no objection, of course, if arbitration agreements were everywhere sustained on this 
basis. Exclusive rules may not always produce the best results. See Lorenzen, supra 
note 192, at 671 et seq. 
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cated directly in the agreement or by the surrounding circumstances 
involves greater difficulty. The Swedish statute199 provides that where 
one of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract is domi-
ciled in Sweden, Swedish law will control; the arbitration agreement 
can be enforced in Sweden against the party domiciled there, but not 
against the other party. In this country the lex domicilii has been dis-
carded so far as commercial contracts are concerned, even in the mat-
ter of capacity, because of the difficulty involved in determining questions 
of domiciJ.2°0 The same objection may be raised against the application 
of the law of domicil in the matter of commercial arbitration, so that our 
courts would probably look to the lex loci contractus. If the agreement 
specifically provides that the arbitration shall be governed by the law 
of a particular state or country, other than the law that would normally 
apply, the courts of the forum should give effect to the intention of the 
parties, provided the law chosen has a reasonable connection with the 
facts of the case and the enforcement of the particular provision is not 
opposed to the public policy of the forum. 
The law of the place of arbitration should determine also the revoca-
bility of the agreement and all substantive rights and duties derived 
therefrom. Thus it would seem clear that the powers and duties of the 
arbitrators should be governed with reference to this law. Where the 
arbitration is to take place in a foreign country, one of the important 
questions would be, in the absence of a specific provision in the agree-
ment, whether the arbitrators are to be bound by the ordinary rules of 
law or whether they are free to follow their own conception of justice 
and right. 
The validity of foreign agreements for arbitration, valid by the proper 
law, would not be recognized, in accordance with the general exception 
found in the conflict of laws, if they came into conflict with the public 
policy of the forum. For example, all courts would decline to enforce 
the arbitration clause if it were contained in a gambling contract: the 
enforcement of which would be deemed contrary to the public policy 
of the forum. The courts might agree also with the provision ~n the 
Swedish statute/01 although there would seem little room for the applica-
tion of this exception in the field of commercial arbitration, that the 
foreign agreement would not be recognized if the matter in dispute 
could not be submitted to arbitration under the local law of the forum. 
Countries like Germany having a requirement that the arbitration clause 
199. See p. 749, supra. 
200. See Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Marshall, 108 Iowa 518, 79 N. W. 282 (1899). 
201. See p. 750, supra. 
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must refer to some "definite legal relationship"202 might regard the re-
quirement as one of international public order so as to defeat any for-
eign contni.ct, valid by the proper law, if it violated such provision. 
On the other hand, it is submitted that the Supreme Court of Austria 
clearly went too far in the matter of public policy in declining to recog-
nize the validity of an oral agreement for arbitration made in Germany 
and valid by German law, for the reason that the Austrian law required 
a writing.203 
There remain to be considered the effects of a valid arbitration agree-
ment, whether domestic or foreign, when the substantive character of 
such agreements is granted. One effect would be that the parties can-
not resort to the ordinary courts for the settlement of any dispute falling 
within the scope of the agreement. Except in states which regard the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements, both local and 
foreign, as opposed to public policy, any proceedings brought in viola-
tion of the arbitration agreement, would, upon motion, be stayed. Wheth-
er or not such a stay is mandatory when it appears that the agreement is 
valid and the dispute within the terms of the agreement, would seem to re-
late primarily to the organization of courts and the power of judges, and 
should be controlled, therefore, by the law of the forum, rather than by 
the law governing the contract. As a matter of local law it would be desir-
able if American courts were given some discretionary power with respect 
to the granting of stays. When granted, an order should provide that un-
less the arbitration is held within a reasonable time an application may 
be made to the court for its revocation.204 
Another effect of a valid agreement for arbitration is that it imposes 
a duty upon the parties to take whatever steps may be necessary to carry 
out the agreement. If the contract provides for arbitration in the state 
of the forum and jurisdiction can be had over the defendant, the avail-
ability of the remedy of specific performance will be governed by the 
law of the forum. In sonie countries there is a reluctance to grant 
specific performance in any case; in others it is the normal remedy for 
the breach of all ordinary contracts.205 Here again, as a matter of 
local1aw, some discretionary power should be vested in the courts. If 
202. See p. 722, sttpra. 
203. Supreme Ct. of Austria, March 8, 1904, 1 NusSBAUM 350. 
204. Phillips, supra note 97, at 221. See Ring v. Menger, Ring and Weinstein, Inc., 
N. Y. L. J. Aug. 14, 1925, where the order read as follows: 
"Motion for a stay is granted, but with leave to plaintiff to move to vacate such stay if 
defendants fail to give notice of the appointment of an arbitrator within ten days after 
service of this order, or if the arbitration is otherwise unduly delayed." 
205. GERMANY, Crv. CoDE § 249. 
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the recalcitrant party cannot be served in the state, ex parte arbitration 
should be allowed, provided the agreement calls for arbitration in that 
state and no assistance is necessary on the part of the courts in the ap-
pointment of arbitrators. 
Where the contract provides for arbitration in another state or coun-
try, the granting of a stay and of an order to compel raises additional 
problems. In foreign countries courts are frequently without power 
to order arbitration abroad. In this country courts of equity have fre-
quently declared that they have no power to order the defendant who is 
before the court to do a positive act abroad. 
A more accurate way of stating the American law would be that the 
power exists, but that it will not be exercised except where it seems 
necessary and proper. Under the existing legislation, which makes both 
the stay and order to compel mandatory, our courts may well hesitate 
before ordering a foreign arbitration, even though they have the power 
to do so. The bargaining power of the parties may not have been equal 
and the provision for arbitration in some other state or country may 
appear to the court to be unfair or too onerous as to one of the parties,206 
or the agreement may provide for arbitration in a state or country where 
the courts will not lend their aid in carrying out the agreement. Again, 
it may be impossible to obtain personal jurisdiction over the recalcitrant 
party in the other state or country and there may exist no authorization 
there for ex parte arbitrations. The situation forcibly indicates the 
necessity that the courts have a certain discretionary power in an appli-
cation for a stay or for an order to compel, and also the desirability of 
a statutory provision that where a submission agreement provides for 
arbitration in the state the courts thereof shall have irrevocable power 
to order the arbitration to proceed.207 The fact that both parties are 
citizens of the state of the forum has been held in Matter of Inter-Ocean 
Food Products, Inc.208 to be a sufficient reason for denying the remedy 
of specific performance where the arbitration is to take place in some 
206. Judge Hough called attention to this problem in Atlimtic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross 
Line, sz1pra note 101, at 221, where he said: 
"The situation above depicted is beyond all question one that calls for remedial action. 
Yet those recognizing the evil, recognize also the difficulty of devising a remedy suitable to 
agreements like charter parties, made in all parts of the world, to be ~rformed on any 
waters and where the natural, yet tyrannical inclination of the stronger party to the 
bargain will be to insert a clause requiring arbitration in his own 'home town.' " 
207. Such provision, however, would be effective only if it is not necessary to apply to 
the court for the appointment of an arbitrator, for which personal service is required. 
Phillips, supra note 97, at 221. 
203. Supra note 35. 
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other state. But it is submitted that citizenship or residence as such 
should not be the determining factor in the solution of the problem. 
If two citizens of a state have agreed to arbitrate in some other state, 
they should be subject to the compulsory process of the law of the state 
to the same extent as citizens of other states, or non-residents in gen-
eraJ.209 
There would appear to be no sufficient reason for the distinction 
made by some courts210 between the granting of a stay and an order to 
compel. In allowing a stay of trial and refusing the order to proceed 
with the foreign arbitration, there is danger that the party staying the 
proceeding may escape all liability on the main contract by failing to 
arbitrate and remaining outside the foreign jurisdiction designated as 
the place of arbitration. Such party should be required therefore to 
post a bond that he will proceed with the foreign arbitration, as a con-
dition precedent to the granting of the order for a stay,211 or the order 
should provide that unless the arbitration is held within a reasonable 
time an application may be made for a revocation of the order. A simi-
lar bond may be required on an application for an order to compel 
arbitration abroad. 
A further question relates to the circumstances in which the courts 
of a state should render active assistance in arbitration proceedings, as 
for instance, by appointing arbitrators. Such power relates to the local 
organization of courts and must be exercised in conformity with the 
law of the forum, regardless of the law of some other state or country 
governing the arbitration agreement. Although the law of the forum 
controls in this matter, there remains the problem of the conditions under 
which the power should be deemed to exist and the time when it should 
be exercised.212 The first requisite would seem to be personal jurisdic-
tion over the recalcitrant party in order that he may have an opportunity 
to be heard in regard to the application. Mere service on such party 
in the state should not be deemed sufficient, however, if the arbitration 
has no other connection with the state. But if the arbitration agree-
209. One of the arguments advanced under the existing legislation in this country 
against the power of the court to order arbitration in another state has been that the 
foreign award would not be enforced in the simplified manner provided for local awards. 
See In re California Packing Corp., supra note 85. Such a difference in the enforcement 
of foreign and local awards should not affect, however, the power of the court to issue 
an order to compel, and if it seemed desirable to facilitate the enforcement of foreign awards, 
this could be done by a statute in an appropriate way. 
210. See pp. 731-733, supra. 
211. See Kirchner v. Gruban, supra note 125. 
212. See Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Co., supra note 85. 
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ment provides for arbitration in the state the courts of that state should 
be deemed to have jurisdiction in the matter. This would seem to be 
true also when no place of arbitration is specified and the arbitration 
may be properly had at the forum. The arbitration statutes should ex-
press themselves in the sense indicated. 
Before the appointment of arbitrators the party living in a state which 
does not have a modern arbitration act can defeat the agreement to 
arbitrate by the simple means of remaining in his jurisdiction.213 He 
can have it enforced against the other party, a resident of a state having 
a modern arbitration act, by going there and asking for an order to com-
pel, but it cannot be enforced against him in his own state. A way out 
of this difficulty can be found through legislation when there is no 
necessity to appeal to the courts for the appointment of an arbitrator, 
for under such circumstances ex parte arbitrations may be authorized 
by statute. Fairness to the non-resident requires, in the opinion of 
Phillips/14 that ex parte arbitrations should be allowed only ( 1) if the 
submission agreement provides for arbitration in the state; or (2) if the 
law of the state governs the contract either as the place of contracting 
or the place of performance; or (3) both parties live in the state. 
Where the arbitration agreement between A and B provides for arbi-
tration according to the law of state X and suit is brought in state Y 
contrary to the agreement, an issue may arise as to whether the courts 
of state X will enjoin the plaintiff from continuing the suit if A can be 
served in state X. The Court of Appeal of England215 granted an 
injunction under similar circumstances. If the injunction were granted 
in state X the courts of state Y would probably feel free to disregard 
it.:ll!l 
A final problem may be alluded to briefly. In England217 and in this 
country218 the courts have refused to recognize the power of individuals 
to "oust the courts of their jurisdiction." Agreements that some court 
other than those of the forum shall have exclusive jurisdiction to deter-
mine disputes between the parties have been regarded as contrary to 
public policy and therefore invalid. The possibility of recourse to the 
courts is held to be for the protection of the individual and therefore 
cannot be set aside by contract. A similar view has been entertained 
213. (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 824. 
214. Supra note 97, at 222-224. See also Finsilver, Still & Moss v. Goldberg M. & Co., 
253 N.Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930). 
215. Pena Copper Mines Ltd. v. Rio Tinto Co. Ltd., supra note 127. 
216. Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1245. 
217. DICEY, op. cit. supra note 115. 
218. See Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1445. 
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also in Italy.219 At the present time there naturally arises the question 
of the effect, if any, of the adoption of the modern arbitration statutes 
upon the validity of such contracts. It is curious that Article 69 of the 
Italian Code of Civil Procedure, which prohibits contracts diminishing 
the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, has been used in Italy for the pur-
pose of defeating agreements for arbitration, whereas in England simi-
lar agreements are regarded as valid submission agreements, falling 
within the protection of the Arbitration Act of 1887. Any action brought 
in England contrary to an agreement that the dispute shall be decided 
by a foreign court will therefore be stayed.220 What the attitude of our 
courts will be in this regard is as yet uncertain.221 One fact, however, 
is significant. The arbitration agreements that have come before the 
English courts have generally provided for arbitration in England, the 
cases in which the arbitration is to take place abroad being relatively rare. 
In Italy, on the other hand, many of the cases coming before the courts 
have called for arbitration in a foreign country, notably in England 
This may explain in part why the English courts have taken a liberal 
view, and the Italian courts a rather narrow one, with respect to this 
matter. 
The settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration is the established 
mode in England, and has proved to be a most satisfactory method. Its 
high repute is due to a long experience with arbitrations and to the close 
cooperation between the courts, the legislature and the commercial bodies. 
In this country, commercial arbitration is still in its earliest stages. Its 
utility is not as yet fully recognized throughout the country even in 
commercial circles. Legislation authorizing the settlement of future 
disputes by arbitration exists only in some twelve states. Our courts 
give the statutes a technical construction and adhere to their traditional 
view that arbitration statutes relate to procedure. The lex fori therefore 
plays a dominant role in the law of arbitration from the standpoint of the 
conflict of laws, thereby impeding most seriously the development of 
arbitration in its interstate and international aspects. Unless arbitra~ 
tion can be relieved in this country of technicality and conflicting legal 
rules it can never be fully successful, and yet the difficulties to be sur-
mounted are great. The best solution, as between the different states of 
this country, would no doubt be the adoption of a uniform and adequate 
arbitration law, and as between this country and foreign countries, adher-
ence to the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in a revised and 
219. See p. 747, supra. 
220. See p. 742, supra. 
221. See pp. 732, 740. 
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improved form. Such solution, however, lies only in the distant future. 
In the meanwhile the responsibility of producing a more satisfactory 
system of commercial arbitration rests with the courts and the legisla~ 
tures. In the light of our experience with arbitration under the State 
Draft Arbitration Act since its first enactment in 1920, it seems neces~ 
sary that certain amendments to the Act be adopted. Some of these · 
have reference to the general machinery of arbitration.222 Others have 
more directly to do with commercial arbitration in its interstate and 
international aspects. In this regard the most important change that 
should be made is the insertion of a specific provision in the Act that 
from the standpoint of the conflict of laws arbitration agreements affect 
the substantive rights of the parties. The Act should contain also cer-
tain guide posts for the courts with respect to arbitration agreements 
made without the state or providing for arbitration wj.thout the state, 
including reference to the validity and irrevocability of such agreements, 
the conduct of the proceedings, and the power of the courts in the ap~ 
pointment of arbitrators and in otherwise lending their assistance to the 
arbitration. When the proper relationship between the courts and ar-
bitral proceedings has been established, there is no reason why arbitra~ 
tion in this country should not become as effective a means in the set-
tlement of commercial disputes as it is in England. 
222. These have been dealt with fully by Phillips, supra notes 50, 97; Rules of Law on 
Laisscz-Faire in Commercial Arbitration (1934) 47 HARv. L. REv. 590. See also Isaacs, 
Two Views of Commercial Arbitration (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 929. 
